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Posts Tagged ‘Afghanistan’

Hosting Refugees

Tuesday, June 21st, 2011

Asserting that Pakistan hosts the highest number of refugees – 1.9 million – the UN said in a report Monday that an estimated 80 per cent of the world’s refugees now live in developing countries and yet anti-refugee sentiment is growing in many industrialized nations.

The 2010 Global Trends report of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), marking the World Refugee Day Monday, urged the richer states to address the deep imbalance. Iran and Syria follow Pakistan with 1.1 million and 1 million refugees, respectively, the report said. Pakistan also feels the biggest economic impact with 710 refugees for each dollar of its per capita gross domestic product (GDP), followed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Kenya, with 475 and 247 refugees per dollar of their per capita GDP respectively.

The number of people forced to flee their homes to escape war or abuse has risen to its highest for 15 years, with four out of five refugees in developing countries, it said.

In absolute terms and in relation to the size of their economies, poor countries shoulder a disproportionate refugee burden, the report added. “What we’re seeing is worrying unfairness in the international protection paradigm,” said Antonio Guterres, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

“Fears about supposed floods of refugees in industrialized countries are being vastly overblown or mistakenly conflated with issues of migration. Meanwhile it’s poorer countries that are left having to pick up the burden,” he said.

Overall, the report portrays a drastically changed protection environment to that of 60 years ago when the UN refugee agency was founded. At that time UNHCR’s caseload of refugees was 2.1 million Europeans uprooted by the Second World War.

Today, UNHCR’s work extends to more than 120 countries and encompasses people forced to flee across borders as well as those in flight within their own countries.

An estimated 43.7 million people are currently displaced worldwide – roughly equalling the entire populations of Colombia or the Republic of Korea or of all Scandinavian countries and Sri Lanka combined.

Of the total, 15.4 million are refugees – 10.55 million under UNHCR’s care and 4.82 million registered with the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Some 27.5 million people displaced internally by conflict and 837,500 are asylum-seekers. The report does not include this year’s internal displacements in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire.

This article originally appeared in the Nation.

Truth Will Set You Free

Wednesday, June 15th, 2011

by Wajid Ali Syed

The relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan has almost always been termed as crucial. It has also been characterized as complicated because of the mistrust on both sides. The question is, why is there so much suspicion? Is it just because of the difference of interests, that the U.S. wants to do one thing while Pakistan another or is it more than that? So far, the reports that have surfaced suggest the latter. The difference of opinion of the people running the war on terror — on both sides — has resulted in a tumultuous relationship.

Even if the U.S. and Pakistan were on the same page on how best to combat terrorism, conflicting and false interpretations of history don’t help. Pakistanis do try to twist the facts in their own favor to boost hatred against the United States. Their reason is primarily based on America’s decision to abandon Pakistan after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. They are now not ready to budge. This can easily be overcome if the U.S. comes clean about all their operations against the militants. They need to share their plans with their allies, especially Pakistani politicans and the people, instead of dealing solely with the military and carrying out covert operations. Did Pakistan agree with the U.S. to use drone strikes or not? If there was an agreement — verbal or written — the U.S. should share that information. This one point can help the U.S. gain trust and would go a long way towards eliminating biases and mistrust over the use of drones.

Americans need to know truth about this war too. They need to understand why Pakistan is an ally and how it can help the U.S. negotiate with the Afghan Taliban. This could only happen once the big shots in Washington jettison their version of the war story and keep their facts straight.

Here’s an example. Richard Clarke — a long time security expert who served four presidents and was the chief counter-terrorism advisor for the National Security Council was on Bill Maher’s show blatantly accusing Pakistan of creating the Afghan Taliban to fight India.

If someone like Clarke, who has been the decision maker on security issues, is way off the mark, then the outcome of this war could be disastrous.

The Taliban in Afghanistan was an indigenous movement formed to counter the Northern Alliance. The Taliban movement was primarily made up of Pashtun tribesmen, the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. Their purpose was to counter the Northern Alliance’s corrupt government. In 1994 and 1995, the Pakistan government was tasked by the U.S. to support the Taliban to restore law and order in Afghanistan and facilitate the construction of UNOCAL’s oil and gas pipeline projects.

The U.S. once again used the Taliban and Pakistan government in its favor just like it used the mujahideen. And like before, things got out of hand. Al- Qaeda became enemies of the U.S. The Taliban eventually backed al-Qaeda, which went on to terrorize the world.

The Taliban government proceeded to impose their brutal interpretation of sharia law on the country. Initially, the U.S. supported the Taliban, hoping they would restore order to a country ravaged by the war against the Soviets.

After 9/11, the U.S. wasted 10 years, billions of dollars and thousands of lives. It blamed the Pakistan army for supporting the Afghan Taliban while at the same time attempting to secretly strike a deal with the Taliban. Either you blame and squabble or join hands and find a solution. Like the expression goes, you can’t have your cake and eat it too.

In the meantime, the U.S. also supported former members of the Northern Alliance and warlords without considering that there cannot be peace in Afghanistan until the Pashtun Afghans get their fair share to rule the country. Even now, a large number of Afghan police and army trained by the U.S. and NATO forces are made up of non-Pashtuns. If the Pashtuns get their way and are included in such projects, discrimination does not let them survive for long. The Pashtuns complain that the Northern Alliance has monopolized important ministry positions, governorships, and embassy postings abroad.

Years later, the U.S. is back to square one, without having learned the lesson that there is no military solution to Afghanistan and Pakistan problem.

The U.S. needs to gain the trust of the people of Pakistan. It needs to realize that Pakistan’s army is not the same as Pakistan. The U.S. needs to ally with the politicians and support democratic institutions instead of men in uniform. The best way to wash off the mistrust is to engage the population and invest in education rather than in arm deals. The Saudis build schools that children can attend for free. The result? In many cases, extremist madrassahs become the only educational option. Why not invest in teaching children how to read?

It needs to negotiate and cut deals with the same Taliban back in Afghanistan. The efforts to achieve peace will be in vain until the U.S. considers Pakistan’s position, keeps its facts straight, brings the truth out in the open and accepts its share of blame. The solution to the Afghan problem cannot be reached until all the facts are understood and all the parties involved are on board.

This article originally appeared in the Huffington Post

Time to re-evaluate U.S-Pakistan relationship

Wednesday, May 25th, 2011

by Sen. Carl Levin and Senator Diane Feinstein

The revelation that Osama bin Laden was comfortably hiding out for years in a city popular with Pakistan’s military elite raises disturbing questions that Islamabad needs to answer.

Pakistan will hopefully hold a high-level, civilian investigation — by respected and qualified people — to discover whether any Pakistani officials knew this and to share those answers with the Pakistani people and the international community.

Some basic questions: How was the land bought? How were permits acquired? How could a conspicuous structure be built without Pakistani officials being aware or investigating?

But even before the bin Laden discovery, Pakistan’s actions over the past few years convinced us that an honest look at the relationship between Washington and Islamabad — including our financial aid to Pakistan — is warranted. We need to examine our mutual strategic interests to determine how they align.

The record has been mixed.

Pakistan’s contributions to countering international terrorism need a clear-eyed review. Islamabad has arrested key senior terrorist leaders, including Sept. 11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. It has suffered greatly at the hands of terrorists — tens of thousands of Pakistani citizens have been killed in terrorist attacks over the past decade. Yet bin Laden’s hiding in plain sight for years suggests either complicity or incompetence on the part of Pakistani officials.

Most disturbing, though, are Pakistan’s continuing ties to extremist militant groups — particularly the Haqqani group in North Waziristan and the Afghan Taliban shura in and around Quetta. Pakistan provides safe harbor to the Haqqani insurgent group responsible for attacks against U.S. and coalition forces across the border in Afghanistan. Regardless of what Pakistan knew about bin Laden’s whereabouts, the Haqqani sanctuaries are well-known.

Similarly, Pakistan continues to provide safe haven for the Afghan Taliban leadership. It is an open secret that the area around Quetta is home to senior Afghan Taliban leaders, including Mullah Omar. This is unacceptable.

Pakistan is also alleged to support the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, known as LT. This organization devised the 2008 Mumbai, India, attack — which killed six Americans. India has requested extradition of the LT leaders, but Pakistan has refused.

U.S.-Pakistan intelligence cooperation has become badly frayed in the past six months. Pakistani media, with the likely assistance of security forces, have twice published names of alleged CIA chiefs of station in Islamabad, posing a safety threat to U.S. citizens in the country.

We also need to review Pakistan’s conduct on nonproliferation. It continues building a significant nuclear arsenal. The Pakistan nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan provided nuclear technology to the world’s most anti-U.S. regimes — including Iran, North Korea and Libya.

In addition, we need to revisit Pakistan’s role in regional stability. Given its population, economy and democratic institutions, Pakistan is inevitably a key player. Yet recent reports that Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani met with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, urging him to weaken ties with Washington and instead strengthen relations with China are disconcerting. During an address to parliament on Monday, Gilani called China “Pakistan’s all-weather friend.”

The U.S.-Pakistan relationship is at a pivotal moment. The return of the tail of the downed helicopter from the bin Laden raid could serve as a useful first step in repairing our ties. But it is essential that Pakistan cut its relations with the Haqqani group and the Afghan Taliban and prevent them from using Pakistan as a safe haven from which to launch attacks in Afghanistan.

Many Pakistanis, including those in the military, believe Washington undervalues the losses they have suffered from terrorist attacks. We understand that feeling — and we believe that should unite us in the fight against those who use Pakistani territory as a base for attacks against the U.S. and its allies. Pakistan should end the impunity, if not tacit approval, that those terrorists receive from Pakistan. As long as that situation exists, it will be difficult to maintain political support in the U.S. for our partnership.

There is still an opportunity to put our countries back on the path of partnership and defeat the terrorists who kill innocent men, women and children — including innocent Pakistanis. But that is likely to require not only answers to the legitimate questions about bin Laden’s presence but strong follow-through on Pakistan’s commitment to act against terrorists openly operating there against us and our allies in Afghanistan.

Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) is chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence. Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) is chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

Pakistan Army: Earn Your Keep

Tuesday, May 10th, 2011

by Wajid Ali Syed

You can’t fool all of the people all of the time. At some point reality catches up to you.

Just like it did in Pakistan over the past week.

During the six years that Osama bin Laden was “hiding” in his compound in Pakistan, experts compiled research, wrote reports and articles and convened panels at think tanks to convince the United States that the ISI — Pakistan’s infamous intelligence agency — has been playing a double game. But the ISI and the Pakistan army continued to benefit from the largesse of American aid and official gratitude for their assistance in the war on terror.

In an old interview, Pervez Musharraf, who was the Chief of the Army and head of the state from 1999 to 2008, said he wanted bin Laden captured anywhere in the world but Pakistan. At around the same time Benizar Bhutto accused Musharraf of hiding terrorists and said that bin Laden could be in the basement of the President’s house in Islamabad. As the world now knows, the world’s most wanted terrorist was a block away from the army garrison. The swaggering confidence of his hosts had to turn into unfathomable embarrassment.

This incident is not the first time the Pakistan Army has made claims that strained credulity. When A.Q. Khan was caught operating a nuclear bazaar that trafficked information to the world’s most notorious regimes, the official Army line was that it had no knowledge of his activities.

Because of arrogance, or overconfidence, the Army chose to overlook the fact that the US had been after bin Laden with force and determination years before 9/11. In mid-August of 1998, the then-Pakistan Army Chief General Jahangir Karamat met his American counterpart, General Joseph Ralston. At the dinner table, General Ralston informed General Karamat that in few minutes some sixty Tomahawk cruise missiles would be entering Pakistan’s airspace to hit a location in Afghanistan where bin Laden was believed to be operating training camps. Obviously, General Karamat was shocked.

The next time the US infiltrated Pakistani air space, it was General Kayani’s turn to be shocked. Only now the destination was different and the mission was a success.

But killing bin Laden does not mean that al Qaeda has been destroyed. It’s not solely a terrorist organization. It facilitates and funds other terrorist groups. According to American journalist and author Mary Ann Weaver, al Qaeda is like a clearinghouse from which other groups obtain funds, training, and logistical support. These other groups exist from Egypt to Algeria, from Yemen to Somalia, from Saudi Arabia to the Philippines and, of course, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Probably for this reason al Qaeda does not face a leadership crisis, as such. Interestingly enough, the next two frontrunners to take charge of al Qaeda could be residing deep in Pakistan.

Evidence shows that before settling in Abbottabad, bin Laden was seen in North Waziristan in the Tirah valley, then in Balochistan for a short time (probably meeting with the Quetta shura). Months after, he was spotted near Meran Shah with none other than Ayman al Zawahari. Later, al Zawahari was seen with Jalaluddin Haqqani, the head of the Taliban in North Waziristan.

Balochistan’s Quetta Shura and North Waziristan still stand out as al Qaeda and Taliban hideouts. Now that the US has embarrassed the Pakistan Army and its intelligence network for being unaware of the presence of the world’s most wanted terrorist in their own backyard, American officials should keep up the pressure and demand the capture of all terrorist group members and especially their leaders. In a grim yet darkly amusing example of the militants’ ability to survive and thrive, in 2002 Taliban leader Mullah Omar escaped the US Army on a motorbike.

The official Pakistani response to bin Laden’s presence in Pakistan doesn’t hold water. But even if we give the Pakistan Army the benefit of the doubt for not knowing where bin Laden was, it has been an open secret that Jalaluddin Haqqani and Mullah Omar reside somewhere deep in Pakistan. The army does know about Mullah Omar and Haqqani, and the US has been asking it to take action.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Senator John Kerry are still on board, claiming that the US needs access to the Afghanistan supply routes via Pakistan. This official excuse to continue sending aid is that the ISI has been an invaluable ally in helping the US root out terrorists. Now the Pakistan Army should make a grand gesture if it wants to be taken seriously as a partner.

Meanwhile, the US should attach some strings to the aid it lavishes on Pakistan. The Pakistan Army has always been a powerbroker in the country, not answerable to anyone. It’s been said that Pakistan is not a country with an army, but an army with a country.

The US was treated to a dose of the Army’s determination to keep a grip on foreign cash during fuss kicked up over the Kerry Lugar bill, a measure that would provide $7.5 billion in non-military aid over a five year period to help the civilian government provide essential services to the population. The Urdu press went berserk, turning the proposal into a dark conspiracy aimed at undermining Pakistani sovereignty. The army exploited the outrage, carving out a good chunk out of the funds. Apart from foreign military aid, the army gets a lion’s share from the national budget without any accountability, funds that could otherwise be used to pay for education and infrastructure.

So, now that the Pakistan Army has been caught red handed eagerly accepting money to fight terrorism while claiming not to know that the world’s most notorious terrorist was living within a stone’s throw of that same army’s training academy, perhaps it’s time for the US to focus on supporting the country’s fragile political government and demand better results and more candor from the military.

This article originally appeared in the Huffington Post

Osama and U.S.-Pakistan Relations

Wednesday, May 4th, 2011

By Michael Krepon

Abbottabad is a quiet, lovely city. The Stimson Center convened a Track II workshop there for rising Pakistani strategic analysts. The city’s most prominent feature remains Kakul, the Pakistani military academy where outstanding recruits begin their studies and service careers. On April 23rd, the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Kayani, visited Kakul to congratulate recent graduates. According to press accounts of the Army Chief’s remarks, Kayani claimed that Pakistani security forces “have broken the back of terrorists and the nation will soon prevail over the menace.” Kayani also asserted that the Pakistan Army “was completely aware of internal and external threats to the country.” Osama bin Laden’s compound was a mile away from the parade ground where Kayani spoke.

Pakistani authorities must be feeling acute embarrassment and resentment at this juncture: embarrassment at Osama’s presence within Pakistan, despite numerous official denials of this possibility, and resentment at a severe breach of Pakistani sovereignty in a settled area. Had U.S. special forces and intelligence failed in this effort, the repercussions on U.S.-Pakistan relations would have been horrific. Having succeeded in bringing Osama bin Laden to justice, the repercussions are extremely trying but not grounds for a divorce. Pakistan’s civil authorities have put a positive gloss on Osama’s death, pointing to longstanding and oft-repeated U.S. statements that, if the location of al-Qaeda’s leadership were correctly ascertained, military action would result. That Pakistan’s security apparatus appears to have been kept in the dark speaks volumes about the growing difficulties of this partnership.

As a reflection of his competence and Pakistan’s extremely troubled internal and external security environment, General Kayani received a three-year extension by the current Pakistani civilian government. The Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence, Lt. General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, has received two one-year extensions. The presence of Osama bin Laden near Kakul reflects very poorly on both of them. The number two ranking al Qaeda figure, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the worst offenders of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, are widely believed to be on Pakistani territory.

Hard times lie ahead for U.S.-Pakistan relations. Our interests in Afghanistan diverge as well as converge. Groups that engage in violent acts against U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan and against targets in India are based, trained and equipped on Pakistani soil, without serious interference by Pakistan’s security apparatus. It is far more convenient and popular for Pakistani politicians to rail against U.S. drone strikes than against extensive Muslim-on-Muslim violence within their country.

Osama bin Laden’s violent demise comes at a time when U.S. expenditures in Afghanistan are reaching the half-trillion dollar mark. It is far from clear that the tactical achievements of U.S. forces there can result in long-lasting gains. It is even more apparent that Pakistan loses by being a safe haven for violent extremists. Osama’s death provides an opportunity for Pakistani and U.S. authorities to reconsider the sources of their deeply troubled relationship.

Michael Krepon is the co-founder of the Stimson Center and the co-editor of “Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia”.

Why the US acted alone

Monday, May 2nd, 2011

by Christopher Dickey

Osama bin Laden’s cave turned out to be a mansion. The desolate mountains where he was hiding proved, in the end, to be the pleasant little hill town of Abbottabad, only 30 miles from the Pakistani capital, Islamabad. He’s been holed up, and on Sunday was at last gunned down, in the biggest house around. He lived with relatives and an entourage behind high walls topped with barbed wire, in a community that’s also home to several Pakistani army units. A military academy is just a few hundred yards down the road.

“There aren’t that many six-foot-plus Arabs walking around that town,” says M.J. Gohel of the Asia-Pacific Foundation in London. “Even if you buy a donkey there it creates a stir. So how could the Pakistani military not know about it?”

We shouldn’t be surprised. Several of the top Al Qaeda bad guys now at Guantánamo were captured deep inside Pakistani territory. And more often than not, they’d been living quite comfortably. “They’re not being caught in some haystack on the border,” Gohel told me back in 2004. Abu Zubaydah, Al Qaeda’s gatekeeper for new recruits and a planner of terrorist operations, got nailed in Faisalabad in 2002; Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the operational mastermind of 9/11, was dragged out of bed in the garrison city of Rawalpindi in 2003; Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, since convicted by a U.S. court for his role in the 1998 bombing of American embassies in Africa and now serving a life sentence in the United States, was grabbed in Gujrat in 2004. In fact, this is not news to U.S. intelligence officials. The overt and covert war along Pakistan’s northwest frontier is important for Afghanistan and American soldiers there. Some mid-level Al Qaeda commanders reportedly have been killed by drone attacks there. But for years, American analysts have suspected that Bin Laden enjoyed the same kind of comforts as his colleagues had had deep in Pakistan’s cities thanks to protection from parts of the Pakistani government and its Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, the infamous ISI. American operatives privately voiced suspicions that Bin Laden’s protectors either sympathized with him or saw him as the ultimate bargaining chip, or both.

So the covert operation closing in on Bin Laden at Abbottabad gained momentum over the last few months, even as the public friction between Washington and Islamabad grew more intense. In January, when two men allegedly tried to rob CIA operative Raymond Davis, he shot them dead—and got arrested by the Pakistanis for murder. Davis was freed in March after a lot of diplomatic maneuvering and payments to the families of the deceased, who pardoned Davis “in accordance with Pakistani law,” according to the White House. But as that case unraveled, it exposed the presence of hundreds of CIA personnel and contractors operating on Pakistani turf. And they weren’t just helping target Hellfire missiles near the Afghan frontier. Davis ran into trouble when he was gathering intelligence in Lahore on the other side of the country.

Last month, when Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen visited Pakistan, he spoke out publicly and with surprising force about America’s problems with the ISI. The specific issue he mentioned was the Pakistani intelligence organization’s “longstanding relationship” with the so-called Haqqani network, which works alongside the Taliban “supporting, funding, training fighters that are killing Americans and killing coalition partners” in Afghanistan. “I have a sacred obligation to do all I can to make sure that doesn’t happen,” said Mullen. “So that’s at the core—it’s not the only thing—but that’s at the core that I think is the most difficult part of the relationship.” Not the only thing indeed.

In President Barack Obama’s carefully phrased description of the “targeted operation” that killed Bin Laden he says cooperation with Pakistan “helped lead us to Bin Laden and the compound where he was hiding,” but it’s apparent “the small team of Americans” who killed him and took away his body were on their own.

Over the long run, the wars that Bin Laden did so much to begin on September 11, 2001, will not end unless some sort of understanding is reached with Pakistan’s government, its military and its intelligence service. “Going forward, it is essential that Pakistan continue to join us in the fight against Al Qaeda and its affiliates,” said Obama. But for its own geopolitical—and purely political—reasons Pakistan is likely to continue being as much part of the problem as part of the solution. At least after the Abbottabad shootout, it’s clear the administration isn’t kidding itself. When it got a shot at Bin Laden, it took it. No dithering. No dilatory diplomacy. Secrecy was maintained. The Pakistanis were cut out. And justice was done.

Christopher Dickey is the Paris bureau chief and Middle East editor for Newsweek Magazine and The Daily Beast.

Pakistan’s Education Crisis

Monday, April 25th, 2011

by Rebecca Winthrop

For the millions of people who read and were inspired by Greg Mortenson’s books, Three Cups of Tea and Stones into Schools, Sunday’s revelations by CBS News’ 60 Minutes that much of his story was at best vastly exaggerated and at worst fabricated, came as deep disappointment. For the thousands of Americans, including school children, who donated to his foundation, the Central Asia Institute, to build schools in the some of the most remote parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan, their disappointment is coupled with disillusionment that their money was probably not well spent.

As I travel around Pakistan this week and look at education issues across the country, including in the Federally Administered Northern Areas where Mortenson’s book Three Cups of Tea was set, I am struck by the bitter-sweet effect of these revelations. On the one hand, Mortenson’s book hid one of the country’s biggest educational success stories and promulgated a model of education assistance that has been proven time and again to be ineffective. On the other hand, his story captured the hearts of millions, bringing needed attention to the very real educational needs of Pakistan’s children and articulating the very important role good quality education can play in reducing conflict risk.

What is the real story of education in Pakistan’s Northern Areas, or Gilgit-Bultistan, as it is now called? How do we make sense of the damaging revelations about the Central Asia Institute that is dedicated to what many believe is still important work?

The Real Education Story in Gilgit-Bultistan

Contrary to the Three Cups of Tea portrayal of Gilgit-Bultistan as a place with little educational opportunity, it is one of the regions in Pakistan that has demonstrated true educational transformation over the last 50 years. In 1946, just prior to partition from India, there were an estimated six primary schools and one middle school for the entire region. Today there are over 1,800 primary, 500 middle, 420 high schools, and almost 40 higher education institutions. Girls are often noted to be outperforming boys and staying in school longer. It is true that community leadership and civil society organizations have played a major role in this transformation; it just was not Mortenson’s Central Asia Institute. When I asked the governor of Gilgit-Bultistan, Pir Syed Karam Ali Shah, how this education transformation came about, he was quick to point to the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), a network of private, international, nondenominational development organizations, an assertion with which other education experts concur. Led by His Highness the Aga Khan, the spiritual leader of the Shia Ismaili Muslims, the concerted focus on improving education, and especially girls’ education, started in 1946 and has continued, led by community members, for decades. Initially starting in the Ismaili communities in Gilgit-Bultistan, the work spread quickly to other non-Ismaili communities in the region, when the clear economic and health benefits of educating girls were seen by neighboring communities. Many civil society organizations, government interventions and public-private partnerships have developed over time, helping to increase levels of human capital and capacity through heavy investment in education, particularly of girls. According to Mehnaz Aziz, member of the national Pakistan Education Task Force, if the rest of Pakistan could only follow in the footsteps of the people of Gilgit-Bultistan, the status of education in Pakistan would be greatly improved.

Yes, There Is an Education Crisis in Pakistan

Despite the education success story of Gilgit-Bultistan, there is a serious education crisis for large numbers of Pakistani children across the country. The underlying message of Mortenson’s book and his related advocacy – that investment in education is greatly needed in Pakistan and it is an important part in promoting peace – still holds true, despite whatever factual inaccuracies in his book. One in 10 of the world’s primary school-age children who are not in school live in Pakistan, making Pakistan one of the top two countries in the world with the largest numbers of out of school children. Only 23 percent of Pakistan’s youth are enrolled in secondary school. At the current rate, the province of Balochistan will only be able to enroll all its children in school by the year 2100. With half the country under the age of 17, this poor state of education is a significant economic and security liability. Increasing access to quality education is likely to reduce Pakistan’s risk of conflict as cross-country estimates show that increasing educational attainment is strongly correlated with conflict risk reduction. Last month, a national campaign – Education Emergency Pakistan 2011 – was launched to spur country-wide dialogue on the need to prioritize educational investment and progress.

Good Intentions Are Not Enough

Despite the importance of Mortenson’s message on the education crisis in Pakistan, the effectiveness of his Central Asia Institute remains questionable. Good intentions do not necessarily translate into effective international development practices and NGO management. In the ongoing search for successful aid models, it is important to highlight that there are many professional non-profit organizations that do excellent education work in Pakistan. Many of them are Pakistani organizations, such as the Citizens Foundation and the Children’s Global Network. Community involvement and leadership are central to many of the work of these organizations, which is further supported by the education expertise of local staff and implementation of basic organizational management principles to track funds and monitor activities.

Stop Just Building Schools

One of the weaknesses of Mortenson’s work on the ground in Pakistan is the education approach he used. “Several of the schools I have seen that he has built in Gilgit-Bultistan are very good structures,” says one senior Pakistani NGO leader, “but his strategy of just building a school and then not providing any other follow up support is one that I think will be unlikely to succeed.” Indeed, Mortenson is neither the first nor the last person to try and solve education problems by building schools. The developing world is littered with school buildings waiting for teachers to be deployed and students to attend. Far greater education minds than Mortenson have fallen into this same trap. In one West African nation I visited, a major World Bank and Ministry of Education project to improve education infrastructure led to new school buildings standing vacant for months and months while teacher deployment and student enrollment systems tried to catch up. Given his almost singular focus on building schools, it is not surprising that some of them appear to have fallen into this same fate. A recent report by McKinsey & Company finds that in the effort to improve education, far too much focus has been placed on inputs such as school buildings and far too little on the improvement of the teaching and learning process.

It is unfortunate that the 60 Minutes expose has called into question the accuracy of Greg Mortenson’s books. Without defending Mortenson or whether the facts in his memoirs are accurate, I can say truthfully that there is indeed a very serious education crisis in Pakistan. The international community should not lose sight of this and the real needs of the Pakistani children and youth seeking to improve their lives.

Rebecca Winthrop is the Director of the Center for Universal Education

Pakistan pulls out of talks with U.S.

Saturday, March 19th, 2011

By Alex Rodriguez

Pakistan on Friday pulled out of upcoming talks with the U.S. on the war in Afghanistan, a move meant to convey Islamabad’s anger over an American drone missile strike that it says killed a gathering of civilians along the Afghan border.

The U.S. and Pakistan disagree on who was killed in the strike Thursday in North Waziristan, a volatile tribal region that serves as a stronghold for an array of militant groups, including Al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban and the Haqqani network, a wing of the Afghan Taliban that regularly attacks U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan.

The U.S. said it struck a compound where militants were meeting. But Pakistani authorities insisted that among the 45 reported dead were tribal elders and other civilians meeting to discuss an ownership dispute over a mine.

The dispute comes at a particularly sensitive time in U.S.-Pakistan relations, when Pakistanis are seething over the release Wednesday of a CIA contractor charged with murdering two motorcyclists in the eastern city of Lahore in late January.

At small protests organized by Islamist parties in Islamabad, Lahore and other cities, demonstrators angrily denounced President Asif Ali Zardari’s government for allowing Raymond Davis to go free. His release was made possible by a “blood money” agreement sanctioned by Pakistani law and negotiated by Islamabad and Washington that allows the accused to pay financial compensation to the victims’ families in exchange for their forgiveness.

In announcing that Pakistan would not take part in talks with Afghanistan and the U.S. scheduled for Brussels on March 26, Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir told U.S. Ambassador Cameron Munter that such drone strikes “constituted a flagrant violation of humanitarian norms and law,” according to a statement by the Foreign Ministry.

Drone strikes are a crucial component in Washington’s strategy against Islamic militant groups hiding out in Pakistan’s largely ungoverned tribal areas, and experts say they have been successful in degrading Al Qaeda and the Taliban’s ability to launch attacks.

Pakistan has maintained a policy of publicly condemning the drone strikes while tacitly allowing them to take place. In some instances, the strikes are carried out with the help of Pakistani intelligence-gathering.

This story originally appeared in the L.A. Times

Terror on the road

Tuesday, February 22nd, 2011

by Sarah A. Topol

From a distance, there’s nothing unusual about the trucks in Karachi’s Shiren Jinnah rest terminal. Lines of empty fuel tankers are parked on the side of a main road, waiting their turn to be filled up near the harbor. Huddled outside the trucks, jovial drivers drink tea, chat, and kill time. It’s only on closer inspection that the scars of war become evident. Bullet holes riddle the bumpers, and parked between the mammoth carriers are the charred skeletal remains of burnt truck carcasses awaiting repair.

These are no ordinary fuel tankers. The trucks parked in this rest stop are bound for Afghanistan, ferrying supplies to U.S. and NATO forces. And all the drivers know someone who has been killed on the clock—burnt alive in the cab or shot by militants bent on disrupting Western lines of supply for America’s longest war.

Nowhere is the war in Afghanistan less popular than in neighboring Pakistan, and the local drivers hired to ferry supplies and fuel to troops are the ones paying the highest price. Men who risk their lives on the perilous roads from Karachi to Kabul or Kandahar are caught in a tangle of poverty, rhetoric, and the imminent threat of death.
“Pakistan is more dangerous than Afghanistan now. I’m more scared here than there. There are forces helping us on the Afghan side. Here, we don’t have help from anyone,” explains Dilshad, a young Pashtun driver who has been carting fuel for NATO forces for the last three years. “The Taliban are saying we’re not supposed to help the West. Before, they used to warn us to stop, now they just kill us.”

The reward for their labor is around $300 a month and assault from all directions. Drivers say they must lie to their wives, they can’t face their neighbors, and they live in fear of the escalating threats from the Taliban, who have stepped up their assault on the supply line in Pakistan in recent years. More than 60 percent of the Pakistani population lives on less than $2 per day, so $300 a month can seem like a lot, but these drivers are generally supporting large families.

Pakistan’s overland route is integral to the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan—40 percent of NATO supplies are trucked in through two of the country’s border crossings. The United States and NATO contract Pakistani companies to ferry fuel, cargo, and food from the port of Karachi into Afghanistan, leaving day-to-day management, insurance, and compensation up to their local operators. An average of 2,500 to 3,000 cargo trucks and 450 to 500 fuel carriers are plying Pakistan’s roads on any given day. A typical journey, drivers say, takes 20 days there and back.
Each year has become more terrifying than the last, Dilshad tells me. Last month, a friend of his was killed when the Taliban set his truck ablaze on the Pakistani side of the route. On Feb. 7, gunmen torched five trucks. On Jan. 30, three trucks were attacked. On Jan. 21, three separate attacks in Pakistan left three trucks torched and one driver shot. On Jan. 19, Pakistan’s local press reported the bodies of three kidnapped drivers were found peppered with bullets. Everyone gathered here has at least one tale of surviving a brush with death.

Drivers say the trucks’ “for export” signs and their special license numbers make them easy targets. Defense analyst Hasan Askari Rizvi explains that long stretches of lonely roads snaking through restive provinces, like Baluchistan, provide a broad area for militants to target, and lax security around rest stops doesn’t help. “When they are parked in a large number in truck depots, these trucks are like sitting ducks, anybody can do anything,” Rizvi said. Some attacks, Rizvi says, are not perpetrated by the Taliban, but by criminal looters who siphon off fuel or commandeer the battle gear and then torch the trucks. But aside from beefing up security around the depots, he thinks there’s little the Pakistani government can do to prevent attacks.

Although the truckers don’t pay for any damage the trucks suffer if they are attacked, they also don’t get compensated if they’re injured on the job. “If we die, our families don’t even get a coffee,” Dilshad says, chuckling ruefully. He describes letters arriving at his house in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (formerly known as the North-West Frontier province), warning him that he is a marked man and commanding him to halt his work. The dozen other drivers gathered around us nod in agreement. They have all received the same letters.

As U.S. drone attacks against militants in North Waziristan intensify, truckers say the perception of being associated with the West has become even more hazardous. In 2010, 118 drone strikes pounded Pakistan’s tribal regions, according to a study by the New America Foundation—that’s roughly one bombing every three days, double the number of strikes the year before.

Drone attacks are touted as one of America’s most effective weapons against insurgents, who hit troops in Afghanistan before seeking refuge across the porous border. But most Pakistanis believe that the targeted strikes kill more civilians than militants and are an affront to national sovereignty, though their government appears to allow them. Nearly 800 people were killed by drone strikes last year, and as of mid-February, there have already been nine strikes in 2011.

Working for the U.S. and NATO forces is so sensitive that most workers don’t want to tell me their full names, while the higher-ups in the industry will only speak on condition of anonymity, for fear of retribution. Within their communities, drivers say they are ostracized for their work.

Many don’t tell their families the specifics of what they do for a living; they claim the Taliban letters are a case of mistaken identity. “I just lie at home. I say, ‘I transport containers, not petrol,’ because it’s less dangerous. And I don’t tell them I go to Afghanistan, just inside Pakistan,” explains Irfan, another driver, who has been working the route for six years. “Sometimes I think I want to get out of this industry, it’s too dangerous, but I need the money,” he says. “It’s not fair—the contractors get the spoils, while we go through the troubles.”

And contractors don’t hide their profits. One manager of a prominent fuel-contracting company is more than blunt. “In the end, it’s the poor man who loses; they are the ones most targeted by terrorists,” he told me, while declining to be named because he worries about reprisals. He says his company provides compensation to injured drivers or the families of those who are killed in the line of duty, but the drivers I spoke to, some of whom worked for that company, say it’s simply not true. They are charged for damage-insurance on the trucks, but they have yet to see a family collect when a driver is killed.

The company manager met me at a posh Karachi cafe. He wanted to stay away from the office so that no one would know he has spoken to the media. “In a time of war, you’re asking me why it’s dangerous?” he shot back when I asked why he doesn’t want me to publish his name. Surely, I suggested, if the Taliban knows which trucks are for export, they also know which companies run them. “Of course they know,” he tells me, “I just don’t want to make a public display of it.” His cousin was killed two months ago—kidnapped, tortured, and shot for working with the United States. He says in the last six years, militants have killed 50 drivers contracted to his company, which runs 1,500 fuel trucks.

“You want to kill, and I help you. We work for you, and we also die for you. The drone attacks kill our children. When I go back to my village, people say, ‘You gave the fuel for the drones that kill children and women,’ and I don’t have an answer,” he says, suddenly singling me out as the representative of the entire NATO effort in Afghanistan.

He has stopped going back to his village in Waziristan’s hinterlands. He has hired private security. “We die for you. What do you do for us?” he asked.

He answers the question himself. “It’s all about the money. The feeling among Pakistanis is we work with Americans, we like their money, but we don’t like their faces,” he grins sheepishly and looks down. I watch the heavy silver watch on his slender wrist brush the table as he wrings his hands.

“I am in this business out of necessity,” he tries to explain. “If we don’t help you, you would give it to India; that would be worse,” he says, referencing Pakistan’s longstanding rivalry and the fear that America will allow India a free hand in Afghanistan.

But at the truck terminal on the other side of the city, drivers’ oil-stained palms stroke heavy beards as they pause to think of answers to my questions about why they cart war supplies through increasingly treacherous territory. For them, working with NATO is not about American foreign policy. “I’m uneducated, I’m poor, and I can’t do anything else. I need the money,” says Khan, another driver.

Khan tucks his curly hair behind his ears and tells me the owner of his truck was killed yesterday. “We just got a new warning from the Taliban to stop working on my last trip. Even the people of Pakistan are scared. The police won’t let me stop to eat and fuel up. Hotels don’t want to let us park in front because they’re afraid. It’s 100-percent dangerous. And the problem is, nobody gives a fuck about us.”

This story originally appeared in Slate

Killings spark CIA fears in Pakistan

Saturday, February 19th, 2011

by Ron Moreau

At first, Taliban militants and local civilians in the Waziristan tribal badlands along Pakistan’s Afghan border thought that bad weather was responsible for the long lull in the attacks by armed Predator drones. “For the first time in months we haven’t heard any ‘buzz-buzz’ overhead for weeks,” says a physician in the town of Mir Ali, referring to the distinctive noise that turbo-prop UAVs make when circling overhead. “We thought the reason was the low, cloudy skies.”

But drone-fired missile strikes against militant targets have now been on hiatus for almost a month—and militants and locals alike are increasingly convinced that the halt is tied to a tense diplomatic standoff between Pakistan and the U.S. over American security agent Raymond Davis.

On January 27, Davis—a former Special Forces solider, now described by the U.S. as a member of the Islamabad embassy’s “administrative and technical staff—was detained by Pakistani police after he blew away two would-be robbers with his Glock semi-automatic pistol in Lahore. The drone attacks happened to cease around the same time as the arrest. Sensing a connection, the militants are rejoicing over Davis’ incarceration: “The arrest of this guy is a very positive thing for us,” says Mullah Jihad Yar, a Pakistani Taliban commander in the area. “Our forces used to be hit by attacks every other day. Now we can move more freely.”

There have been previous pauses in Predator strikes before—Bill Roggio’s authoritative log at www.longwarjournal.org shows two shutdowns in 2009 (of 33 and 28 days in length) and two in 2010 (of 19 and 15 days in length). In those instances, bad weather was indeed cited as the cause. But this time, the Waziri residents seem to have guessed right. Newsweek has confirmed that it’s no coincidence the ramped-up attacks ended abruptly with Davis’ arrest. A senior Pakistani official has confirmed that Davis’ case is directly connected to the freezing of the attacks, and says that Washington is afraid of further inflaming anti-American sentiment in Pakistan in the wake of the shootings. The U.S. insists that Davis fired in self-defense at the men—who reportedly flashed guns at him as they drove by on a motorcycle—and that he enjoys full diplomatic immunity. Embassy officials are pressing for him to be released immediately into American custody. The Pakistani police, meanwhile, are considering possible murder charges. This week, the Lahore court gave Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari’s beleaguered government three more weeks to decide whether Davis, who remains in jail, is indeed entitled to full diplomatic protection.

The case couldn’t be more politically sensitive for Zardari and his government, who have been steadfast allies of the U.S. in the war against Islamic extremism. Most Pakistanis are incensed by the killings and see Davis and his shoot-from-the-hip actions—just as they see the drone strikes—as a blatant symbol of U.S. arrogance and its disregard for Pakistani laws and sovereignty. Both American and Pakistani officials fear that while the case is negotiated behind the scenes, any further drone attacks could set off destabilizing street protests. “Ninety-nine percent of Pakistanis believe he’s a killer,” says a Pakistani intelligence official who declined to be named, as he is not authorized to speak to the press. “So we conveyed the message to the U.S. to stop the attacks, in order not to make a bad situation worse.”

Many Pakistanis also question why Davis, who was dressed in jeans and a checkered shirt on the night of the arrest, was driving through Lahore with a loaded pistol, extra magazines and ammunition, a GPS device, several cell phones and a telescope. The U.S. government also has its own questions about what Davis and other shadowy Americans are up to in Pakistan. According to the senior Pakistani official, the U.S. government has only a sketchy notion of what Davis and other security contractors and intelligence agents are actually doing on the ground. As a result, the CIA’s activities in Pakistan have more or less been temporarily shut down, according to the official, while a review of the agency’s activities is carried out. Hence the temporary drone freeze, since the drone program is under the direction of the CIA.

Over the past year, U.S. President Barack Obama dramatically escalated the drone strikes, more than doubling them from 45 attacks inside Pakistan’s tribal area in 2009 to some 118 last year. In the first three weeks of 2011, the CIA flew nine drone attack missions, with the final three being nearly simultaneous attacks on targets in Warizistan on January 22 in which at least 13 suspected Taliban fighters were killed. But until the Davis case is resolved, which could take a month or longer, the Taliban and al Qaeda may have the unexpected luxury of not worrying about sudden death raining down on them from the skies.

Ron Moreau is Newsweek’s Afghanistan and Pakistan correspondent and has been covering the region for the magazine the past 10 years. Since he first joined Newsweek during the Vietnam War, he has reported extensively from Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. This story originally appeared in The Daily Beast.



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