The Pakistan Update

by Sen. Carl Levin and Senator Diane Feinstein

The revelation that Osama bin Laden was comfortably hiding out for years in a city popular with Pakistan’s military elite raises disturbing questions that Islamabad needs to answer.

Pakistan will hopefully hold a high-level, civilian investigation — by respected and qualified people — to discover whether any Pakistani officials knew this and to share those answers with the Pakistani people and the international community.

Some basic questions: How was the land bought? How were permits acquired? How could a conspicuous structure be built without Pakistani officials being aware or investigating?

But even before the bin Laden discovery, Pakistan’s actions over the past few years convinced us that an honest look at the relationship between Washington and Islamabad — including our financial aid to Pakistan — is warranted. We need to examine our mutual strategic interests to determine how they align.

The record has been mixed.

Pakistan’s contributions to countering international terrorism need a clear-eyed review. Islamabad has arrested key senior terrorist leaders, including Sept. 11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. It has suffered greatly at the hands of terrorists — tens of thousands of Pakistani citizens have been killed in terrorist attacks over the past decade. Yet bin Laden’s hiding in plain sight for years suggests either complicity or incompetence on the part of Pakistani officials.

Most disturbing, though, are Pakistan’s continuing ties to extremist militant groups — particularly the Haqqani group in North Waziristan and the Afghan Taliban shura in and around Quetta. Pakistan provides safe harbor to the Haqqani insurgent group responsible for attacks against U.S. and coalition forces across the border in Afghanistan. Regardless of what Pakistan knew about bin Laden’s whereabouts, the Haqqani sanctuaries are well-known.

Similarly, Pakistan continues to provide safe haven for the Afghan Taliban leadership. It is an open secret that the area around Quetta is home to senior Afghan Taliban leaders, including Mullah Omar. This is unacceptable.

Pakistan is also alleged to support the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, known as LT. This organization devised the 2008 Mumbai, India, attack — which killed six Americans. India has requested extradition of the LT leaders, but Pakistan has refused.

U.S.-Pakistan intelligence cooperation has become badly frayed in the past six months. Pakistani media, with the likely assistance of security forces, have twice published names of alleged CIA chiefs of station in Islamabad, posing a safety threat to U.S. citizens in the country.

We also need to review Pakistan’s conduct on nonproliferation. It continues building a significant nuclear arsenal. The Pakistan nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan provided nuclear technology to the world’s most anti-U.S. regimes — including Iran, North Korea and Libya.

In addition, we need to revisit Pakistan’s role in regional stability. Given its population, economy and democratic institutions, Pakistan is inevitably a key player. Yet recent reports that Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani met with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, urging him to weaken ties with Washington and instead strengthen relations with China are disconcerting. During an address to parliament on Monday, Gilani called China “Pakistan’s all-weather friend.”

The U.S.-Pakistan relationship is at a pivotal moment. The return of the tail of the downed helicopter from the bin Laden raid could serve as a useful first step in repairing our ties. But it is essential that Pakistan cut its relations with the Haqqani group and the Afghan Taliban and prevent them from using Pakistan as a safe haven from which to launch attacks in Afghanistan.

Many Pakistanis, including those in the military, believe Washington undervalues the losses they have suffered from terrorist attacks. We understand that feeling — and we believe that should unite us in the fight against those who use Pakistani territory as a base for attacks against the U.S. and its allies. Pakistan should end the impunity, if not tacit approval, that those terrorists receive from Pakistan. As long as that situation exists, it will be difficult to maintain political support in the U.S. for our partnership.

There is still an opportunity to put our countries back on the path of partnership and defeat the terrorists who kill innocent men, women and children — including innocent Pakistanis. But that is likely to require not only answers to the legitimate questions about bin Laden’s presence but strong follow-through on Pakistan’s commitment to act against terrorists openly operating there against us and our allies in Afghanistan.

Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) is chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence. Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) is chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

Tags: 9/11, A.Q. Khan, Afghan Taliban, Afghanistan, carl levin, china, CIA, diane feinstein, Featured, Hamid Karzai, haqqani network, Iran, khalid sheikh mohammed, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, libya, Mullah Omar, non-proliferation, north korea, North Waziristan, nuclear weapons, Osama Bin Laden, Pakistan, Pakistan Army, Pakistan Media, pakistan nuclear weapons, US Pak relations, Yousaf Raza Gilani

Posted in Afghanistan, Blog, News | 1,578 Comments »

by Wajid Ali Syed

You can’t fool all of the people all of the time. At some point reality catches up to you.

Just like it did in Pakistan over the past week.

During the six years that Osama bin Laden was “hiding” in his compound in Pakistan, experts compiled research, wrote reports and articles and convened panels at think tanks to convince the United States that the ISI — Pakistan’s infamous intelligence agency — has been playing a double game. But the ISI and the Pakistan army continued to benefit from the largesse of American aid and official gratitude for their assistance in the war on terror.

In an old interview, Pervez Musharraf, who was the Chief of the Army and head of the state from 1999 to 2008, said he wanted bin Laden captured anywhere in the world but Pakistan. At around the same time Benizar Bhutto accused Musharraf of hiding terrorists and said that bin Laden could be in the basement of the President’s house in Islamabad. As the world now knows, the world’s most wanted terrorist was a block away from the army garrison. The swaggering confidence of his hosts had to turn into unfathomable embarrassment.

This incident is not the first time the Pakistan Army has made claims that strained credulity. When A.Q. Khan was caught operating a nuclear bazaar that trafficked information to the world’s most notorious regimes, the official Army line was that it had no knowledge of his activities.

Because of arrogance, or overconfidence, the Army chose to overlook the fact that the US had been after bin Laden with force and determination years before 9/11. In mid-August of 1998, the then-Pakistan Army Chief General Jahangir Karamat met his American counterpart, General Joseph Ralston. At the dinner table, General Ralston informed General Karamat that in few minutes some sixty Tomahawk cruise missiles would be entering Pakistan’s airspace to hit a location in Afghanistan where bin Laden was believed to be operating training camps. Obviously, General Karamat was shocked.

The next time the US infiltrated Pakistani air space, it was General Kayani’s turn to be shocked. Only now the destination was different and the mission was a success.

But killing bin Laden does not mean that al Qaeda has been destroyed. It’s not solely a terrorist organization. It facilitates and funds other terrorist groups. According to American journalist and author Mary Ann Weaver, al Qaeda is like a clearinghouse from which other groups obtain funds, training, and logistical support. These other groups exist from Egypt to Algeria, from Yemen to Somalia, from Saudi Arabia to the Philippines and, of course, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Probably for this reason al Qaeda does not face a leadership crisis, as such. Interestingly enough, the next two frontrunners to take charge of al Qaeda could be residing deep in Pakistan.

Evidence shows that before settling in Abbottabad, bin Laden was seen in North Waziristan in the Tirah valley, then in Balochistan for a short time (probably meeting with the Quetta shura). Months after, he was spotted near Meran Shah with none other than Ayman al Zawahari. Later, al Zawahari was seen with Jalaluddin Haqqani, the head of the Taliban in North Waziristan.

Balochistan’s Quetta Shura and North Waziristan still stand out as al Qaeda and Taliban hideouts. Now that the US has embarrassed the Pakistan Army and its intelligence network for being unaware of the presence of the world’s most wanted terrorist in their own backyard, American officials should keep up the pressure and demand the capture of all terrorist group members and especially their leaders. In a grim yet darkly amusing example of the militants’ ability to survive and thrive, in 2002 Taliban leader Mullah Omar escaped the US Army on a motorbike.

The official Pakistani response to bin Laden’s presence in Pakistan doesn’t hold water. But even if we give the Pakistan Army the benefit of the doubt for not knowing where bin Laden was, it has been an open secret that Jalaluddin Haqqani and Mullah Omar reside somewhere deep in Pakistan. The army does know about Mullah Omar and Haqqani, and the US has been asking it to take action.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Senator John Kerry are still on board, claiming that the US needs access to the Afghanistan supply routes via Pakistan. This official excuse to continue sending aid is that the ISI has been an invaluable ally in helping the US root out terrorists. Now the Pakistan Army should make a grand gesture if it wants to be taken seriously as a partner.

Meanwhile, the US should attach some strings to the aid it lavishes on Pakistan. The Pakistan Army has always been a powerbroker in the country, not answerable to anyone. It’s been said that Pakistan is not a country with an army, but an army with a country.

The US was treated to a dose of the Army’s determination to keep a grip on foreign cash during fuss kicked up over the Kerry Lugar bill, a measure that would provide $7.5 billion in non-military aid over a five year period to help the civilian government provide essential services to the population. The Urdu press went berserk, turning the proposal into a dark conspiracy aimed at undermining Pakistani sovereignty. The army exploited the outrage, carving out a good chunk out of the funds. Apart from foreign military aid, the army gets a lion’s share from the national budget without any accountability, funds that could otherwise be used to pay for education and infrastructure.

So, now that the Pakistan Army has been caught red handed eagerly accepting money to fight terrorism while claiming not to know that the world’s most notorious terrorist was living within a stone’s throw of that same army’s training academy, perhaps it’s time for the US to focus on supporting the country’s fragile political government and demand better results and more candor from the military.

This article originally appeared in the Huffington Post

Tags: 9/11, A.Q. Khan, Abbottabad, Afghanistan, Al Qaeda, algeria, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Balochistan, Benazir Bhutto, double game, Egypt, Featured, General Ashfaq Kayani, General Joseph Ralston, Hillary Clinton, ISI, Jahangir Karamat, Jalaluddin Haqqani, John Kerry, Kerry Lugar Bill, Mullah Omar, North Waziristan, Osama Bin Laden, Pakistan, Pakistan Army, Pervez Musharraf, philippines, Quetta Shura, Saudi Arabia, somalia, urdu media, yemen

Posted in Blog, News | 2,064 Comments »

By Michael Krepon

Abbottabad is a quiet, lovely city. The Stimson Center convened a Track II workshop there for rising Pakistani strategic analysts. The city’s most prominent feature remains Kakul, the Pakistani military academy where outstanding recruits begin their studies and service careers. On April 23rd, the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Kayani, visited Kakul to congratulate recent graduates. According to press accounts of the Army Chief’s remarks, Kayani claimed that Pakistani security forces “have broken the back of terrorists and the nation will soon prevail over the menace.” Kayani also asserted that the Pakistan Army “was completely aware of internal and external threats to the country.” Osama bin Laden’s compound was a mile away from the parade ground where Kayani spoke.

Pakistani authorities must be feeling acute embarrassment and resentment at this juncture: embarrassment at Osama’s presence within Pakistan, despite numerous official denials of this possibility, and resentment at a severe breach of Pakistani sovereignty in a settled area. Had U.S. special forces and intelligence failed in this effort, the repercussions on U.S.-Pakistan relations would have been horrific. Having succeeded in bringing Osama bin Laden to justice, the repercussions are extremely trying but not grounds for a divorce. Pakistan’s civil authorities have put a positive gloss on Osama’s death, pointing to longstanding and oft-repeated U.S. statements that, if the location of al-Qaeda’s leadership were correctly ascertained, military action would result. That Pakistan’s security apparatus appears to have been kept in the dark speaks volumes about the growing difficulties of this partnership.

As a reflection of his competence and Pakistan’s extremely troubled internal and external security environment, General Kayani received a three-year extension by the current Pakistani civilian government. The Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence, Lt. General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, has received two one-year extensions. The presence of Osama bin Laden near Kakul reflects very poorly on both of them. The number two ranking al Qaeda figure, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the worst offenders of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, are widely believed to be on Pakistani territory.

Hard times lie ahead for U.S.-Pakistan relations. Our interests in Afghanistan diverge as well as converge. Groups that engage in violent acts against U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan and against targets in India are based, trained and equipped on Pakistani soil, without serious interference by Pakistan’s security apparatus. It is far more convenient and popular for Pakistani politicians to rail against U.S. drone strikes than against extensive Muslim-on-Muslim violence within their country.

Osama bin Laden’s violent demise comes at a time when U.S. expenditures in Afghanistan are reaching the half-trillion dollar mark. It is far from clear that the tactical achievements of U.S. forces there can result in long-lasting gains. It is even more apparent that Pakistan loses by being a safe haven for violent extremists. Osama’s death provides an opportunity for Pakistani and U.S. authorities to reconsider the sources of their deeply troubled relationship.

Michael Krepon is the co-founder of the Stimson Center and the co-editor of “Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia”.

Tags: Abbottabad, Afghanistan, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Featured, General Ashfaq Kayani, ISI, Lt. General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, Osama Bin Laden, Pakistan, Pakistan Army, Taliban, US Pak relations

Posted in Around, Blog, News | 1,516 Comments »

By Wajid Ali Syed

Bin Ladin is dead. Again. In the last ten years he has been reported “killed” at least four times. The only difference this time was that the President of the United States announced the death of the number one terrorist in the world. Above all, this time he was killed not in Tora Bora, not Karra Kurrum, but Abbottabad – close to an army garrison in Pakistan. As expected, his killing has raised questions, and more questions, and still more questions every time a new statement is added to the swirl of fact and myth that is turning the bin Laden raid into the stuff of legend.

Basically, a foreign national has been killed by another foreign army. (more…)

Tags: Abottabad, Al Qaeda, Army, CIA, Featured, ISI, Islamabad, Islamic groups, Obama, Osama Bin Laden, Pakistan, Taliban, US

Posted in Afghanistan, Around, Blog, India | 1,466 Comments »

by Christopher Dickey

Osama bin Laden’s cave turned out to be a mansion. The desolate mountains where he was hiding proved, in the end, to be the pleasant little hill town of Abbottabad, only 30 miles from the Pakistani capital, Islamabad. He’s been holed up, and on Sunday was at last gunned down, in the biggest house around. He lived with relatives and an entourage behind high walls topped with barbed wire, in a community that’s also home to several Pakistani army units. A military academy is just a few hundred yards down the road.

“There aren’t that many six-foot-plus Arabs walking around that town,” says M.J. Gohel of the Asia-Pacific Foundation in London. “Even if you buy a donkey there it creates a stir. So how could the Pakistani military not know about it?”

We shouldn’t be surprised. Several of the top Al Qaeda bad guys now at Guantánamo were captured deep inside Pakistani territory. And more often than not, they’d been living quite comfortably. “They’re not being caught in some haystack on the border,” Gohel told me back in 2004. Abu Zubaydah, Al Qaeda’s gatekeeper for new recruits and a planner of terrorist operations, got nailed in Faisalabad in 2002; Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the operational mastermind of 9/11, was dragged out of bed in the garrison city of Rawalpindi in 2003; Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, since convicted by a U.S. court for his role in the 1998 bombing of American embassies in Africa and now serving a life sentence in the United States, was grabbed in Gujrat in 2004. In fact, this is not news to U.S. intelligence officials. The overt and covert war along Pakistan’s northwest frontier is important for Afghanistan and American soldiers there. Some mid-level Al Qaeda commanders reportedly have been killed by drone attacks there. But for years, American analysts have suspected that Bin Laden enjoyed the same kind of comforts as his colleagues had had deep in Pakistan’s cities thanks to protection from parts of the Pakistani government and its Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, the infamous ISI. American operatives privately voiced suspicions that Bin Laden’s protectors either sympathized with him or saw him as the ultimate bargaining chip, or both.

So the covert operation closing in on Bin Laden at Abbottabad gained momentum over the last few months, even as the public friction between Washington and Islamabad grew more intense. In January, when two men allegedly tried to rob CIA operative Raymond Davis, he shot them dead—and got arrested by the Pakistanis for murder. Davis was freed in March after a lot of diplomatic maneuvering and payments to the families of the deceased, who pardoned Davis “in accordance with Pakistani law,” according to the White House. But as that case unraveled, it exposed the presence of hundreds of CIA personnel and contractors operating on Pakistani turf. And they weren’t just helping target Hellfire missiles near the Afghan frontier. Davis ran into trouble when he was gathering intelligence in Lahore on the other side of the country.

Last month, when Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen visited Pakistan, he spoke out publicly and with surprising force about America’s problems with the ISI. The specific issue he mentioned was the Pakistani intelligence organization’s “longstanding relationship” with the so-called Haqqani network, which works alongside the Taliban “supporting, funding, training fighters that are killing Americans and killing coalition partners” in Afghanistan. “I have a sacred obligation to do all I can to make sure that doesn’t happen,” said Mullen. “So that’s at the core—it’s not the only thing—but that’s at the core that I think is the most difficult part of the relationship.” Not the only thing indeed.

In President Barack Obama’s carefully phrased description of the “targeted operation” that killed Bin Laden he says cooperation with Pakistan “helped lead us to Bin Laden and the compound where he was hiding,” but it’s apparent “the small team of Americans” who killed him and took away his body were on their own.

Over the long run, the wars that Bin Laden did so much to begin on September 11, 2001, will not end unless some sort of understanding is reached with Pakistan’s government, its military and its intelligence service. “Going forward, it is essential that Pakistan continue to join us in the fight against Al Qaeda and its affiliates,” said Obama. But for its own geopolitical—and purely political—reasons Pakistan is likely to continue being as much part of the problem as part of the solution. At least after the Abbottabad shootout, it’s clear the administration isn’t kidding itself. When it got a shot at Bin Laden, it took it. No dithering. No dilatory diplomacy. Secrecy was maintained. The Pakistanis were cut out. And justice was done.

Christopher Dickey is the Paris bureau chief and Middle East editor for Newsweek Magazine and The Daily Beast.

Tags: Abbottabad, Abu Zubaydah, Admiral Mike Mullen, Afghanistan, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, Al Qaeda, Asia-Pacific Foundation, Barack Obama, Faisalabad, Featured, Guantánamo, Gujrat, haqqani network, Hellfire missiles, ISI, Islamabad, khalid sheikh mohammed, Lahore, M.J. Gohel, Osama Bin Laden, Pakistan, Pakistan Army, Rawalpindi, Raymond Davis, Taliban

Posted in Afghanistan, Blog, News | 1,985 Comments »

by Bruce Reidel

Osama bin Laden’s death is a severe blow to al Qaeda–but not its end. His death answers some key questions about the terror cell and Pakistan, but leaves some even more perplexing ones still open.

First, congratulations to President Obama and the CIA. From the very start of his administration he ordered an intense focus on al Qaeda and its leader. The trail had long gone cold due largely to the diversion of critical resources to Iraq back in 2002 and 2003. Obama rightly promised to focus on Pakistan, the center of the global jihad and the most dangerous country in the world, and his efforts have now paid off.

Many had questioned whether bin Laden was still alive almost ten years after 9/11. But there was never really any doubt. By eluding justice after his first attacks on America in 1998, bin Laden created a mystique of invulnerability. He remained not just a symbol of al Qaeda’s continuing threat but a real leader, issuing strategic direction and propaganda.

His death weakens al Qaeda’s cohesion and its image of being beyond the reach of America. It comes after two years of intense pressure on the group and its allies in Pakistan and Afghanistan from American drones in the skies as well as NATO boots on the ground in Afghanistan. Key lieutenants like his operational commander in Afghanistan, a fellow Saudi named Abdul Ghani, have been tracked down and killed just this spring. The pressure was designed to weaken al Qaeda’s operational tempo, disrupting its routines. The strategy has worked. Presumably his hideout deep in Pakistan also contained clues and data that will help further dismantle al Qaeda’s core.

But the terror cell has always known bin Laden was at risk and it has devolved much authority to his deputy, the Egyptian Ayman Zawahiri, and to others. Zawahiri has been the public face of al Qaeda for years. Just this year he has released five audio messages focused on the Arab spring (he put out only four in all of last year). Bin Laden in contrast was silent about the wave of revolutions in Arabia. The New Mexico born Yemeni Anwar Awlaki has emerged as another operational and propaganda hub with his on line English language magazine Inspire and his al Qaeda Yemen cell has tried to attack Detroit and Chicago already. We can expect effusive memorials from them to their fallen “martyr.”

And we should expect the threat of more al Qaeda attacks to remain real. This weekend, several terrorists linked to al Qaeda were arrested for plotting an attack in Germany. Last week, the group’s Maghreb affiliate struck in Morocco, killing Western tourists.

Obama was right to call his Pakistani counterpart, Asif Ali Zardari, to thank him for help in the chase. Zardari’s wife Benazir Bhutto was murdered by al Qaeda in 2007; the death of the country’s most popular and capable leader was perhaps the group’s biggest triumph since 9/11. Pakistan has yet to recover from her demise. Al Qaeda has been focused like a laser beam on Pakistan for the last decade. It rightly judges Pakistan to be both uniquely vulnerable in the Islamic world to jihadism and equipped with the ultimate strategic prize, the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world. With allies like the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba, al Qaeda will remain a threat to Pakistan’s nascent democracy and to peace in the Indian subcontinent.

Obama should schedule an early Zardari visit to Washington and his own visit later this year to Pakistan to signal our support for democratic forces there. We also now know what many long suspected: that Bin Laden was not hiding in Pakistan’s tribal wastelands, but rather in its heartland. He was killed in Abbotabad, the home town of Pakistan’s first military dictator, Ayub Khan, just thirty miles from the capital Islamabad. This raises the question: who helped him all these years hide in-country? He was not alone in al Qaeda in hiding out in Pakistan’s towns and cities. Khalid Shaykh Muhammad and Abu Zubayda, two key al Qaeda operatives, were caught in Pakistan’s urban centers. Mullah Omar, bin Laden’s Afghan Taliban partner (and the man he swore loyalty to even in the last few years) has long been thought to be hiding in Pakistan’s mega- port of Karachi. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has often publicly said she suspected some in the Pakistani establishment knew where to find bin Laden. She raised the right question. It remains a good one.

Al Qaeda long ago became more than a terror group. It is an idea, the concept of global jihad against America. It has an elaborate narrative to justify murder. But Bin Laden was caught off guard by the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions this winter and the wave of turmoil that has followed them. These popular uprisings challenged his whole worldview that terror and jihad were the only way to free Islam of its dictators and of what he called “Crusader-Zionist oppression.” The triumph of freedom in Tahrir Square was a blow to al Qaeda—a sign that aside from in Pakistan and Yemen, the group seemed increasingly marginalized. NATO is now fighting to free Libya, not to occupy it. Whether al Qaeda can adapt to the new Arab renaissance is an open question. Bin Laden won’t be able to answer it. Can his heirs?

Bruce Riedel, a former longtime CIA officer, is a senior fellow in the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution. At Obama’s request, he chaired the strategic review of policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2009.

Tags: 9/11, Abbotabad, Abdul Ghani, Abu Zubayda, Al Qaeda, Anwar Awlaki, Ayman Zawahiri, Ayub Khan, Benazir assassination, Benazir Bhutto, CIA, drones, Featured, Hillary Clinton, Islamabad, Jihad, karachi, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, Lashkar e Taiba, Mullah Omar, NATO, Obama, Pakistan, President Asif Ali Zardari, Taliban

Posted in Afghanistan, Blog, News | 1,021 Comments »

By Michael Krepon, Ziad Haider, and Charles Thornton

Since India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, their leaders have rhetorically rejected the concept and requirements of nuclear war-fighting. While New Delhi and Islamabad appear quite confident that they will not repeat the Cold War mistakes of Washington and Moscow in relying on nuclear war-fighting options to bolster deterrence, it is far from clear that the South Asian nuclear rivals would be willing to take steps to agree to constraints or to forego entirely short-range, battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons. Declaratory statements to this effect would not be verifiable, but would reinforce public statements in favor of credible minimal deterrence and against nuclear war-fighting concepts of deterrence. The absence of new production and flight-testing of short-range, nuclear-capable ballistic missiles would lend credence to public disavowals of intent to pursue nuclear war-fighting capabilities.

The dilemmas associated with nuclear weapons having very short ranges are particularly acute. The most prominent applicable dilemma relates to escalation control. Any use of such a weapon – even a singular demonstration shot by the weaker party to signal the urgency of stopping a threatening advance – presents a strong likelihood of uncontrolled escalation. While the dilemma of escalation control applies to any use of nuclear weapons in South Asia, the potential for this theoretical dilemma to become real increases if short-range nuclear weapon delivery vehicles are deployed on the battlefield.

With conventional conflict amidst missile deployments, much will be left to chance. If short-range ballistic missiles are deployed close enough to an adversary’s forces to damage them or some other target that the adversary holds dear, a breakdown of deterrence would have immediate, catastrophic effects. The trigger for uncontrolled escalation could occur if fighting erupts, if a missile battery is captured, if a local commander exercises a pre-delegated authority to fire the missile, or if command and control arrangements break down. Alternatively, uncontrolled escalation could be triggered before combat begins as a result of an accident relating to deployment or through the actions of an extremist group during the depths of a crisis.

Another concern is force protection. There are more opportunities for something unfortunate to happen when tactical nuclear weapons are forward deployed than when they reside in highly secure storage facilities. Some of the dilemmas of force protection in South Asia can be addressed by not deploying nuclear warheads mated with their launch vehicles in a crisis, where they could be subject to accidents, seizures, and breakdowns in command and control. If, however, the requirements of rapid response are deemed to be paramount, the dilemmas of vulnerability and maintaining strict command and control will rise to the fore.

How serious are Indian and Pakistani leaders in asserting that they do not intend to build nuclear war-fighting arsenals? If these assertions are genuine, and if national leaders wish to demonstrate their intent not to follow the mistakes of other states that possess nuclear weapons, how might they do so? One way would be for the governments of India and Pakistan not to engage in additional flight tests of certain short-range ballistic missiles. National leaders could publicly designate which existing missile system would not be flight-tested in the future. “Giving up” this option may be more difficult for Pakistan, because the forward deployment of short-range ballistic missiles might be viewed in some quarters as reinforcing deterrence when the order of battle is unfavorable.

Lesser constraints on missile flight tests could also have utility. For example, flight tests for existing and new missile programs could continue, but under conditions that increase stability and that begin to lay the groundwork for long-distance, cooperative monitoring. A far more dramatic gesture to signal disinterest in developing, producing, or relying upon tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear war-fighting strategies would be to dismantle and destroy existing short-range ballistic missiles, either by designated type or by a mutually agreed range threshold. Alternatively, each side could designate a particular class or classes of missiles to be subject to dismantlement and destruction. There are many obstacles that stand in the way of such an accord. Powerful institutional interests and domestic constituencies in both Pakistan and India might be opposed to dismantling any missiles that are a source of national pride, even if they have marginal military utility and pose significant dilemmas on the battlefield. Verification would also be a thorny issue for an agreement of this kind.

A less dramatic, but still highly symbolic, accord can be envisioned that sidesteps problems of verification. National leaders in both countries could pledge publicly not to deploy such missiles, even in times of heightened tension. An agreement of this sort faces long odds. Non-deployment pledges would face stiff opposition on the grounds that any weapon deemed necessary to produce and maintain ought not to be prohibited from appearing on the battlefield. Definitions of what constitutes “deployment” and “non-deployment” might vary, and a non-deployment ban might not be honored during a crisis.

Some of the proposals we offer here are modest, but extremely useful. The more ambitious proposals will require considerable political will to enact over the resistance of powerful interest groups. Regardless of the state of the nuclear competition or the size of nuclear arsenals, national security establishments and “strategic enclaves” will be loath to constrain military flexibility and nuclear options. It is the responsibility of national leaders to weigh these concerns against broader imperatives to reduce nuclear dangers. Such agreements would be predicated on hard-headed assessments that the military utility of short-range ballistic missiles is extremely modest compared to the dilemmas of escalation control, vulnerability, command and control, and resource allocation. National leaders in Pakistan and India have pledged not to repeat the mistakes of other nuclear-armed nations. They have an opportunity to demonstrate their opposition to nuclear war-fighting strategies and capabilities by agreeing to measures to clarify this intention. Tactical nuclear weapons are poorly suited for military purposes in South Asia, and well suited for nuclear risk-reduction measures.

Michael Krepon is co-founder of the Stimson Center. Ziad Haider is a joint degree candidate at Georgetown Law and the Harvard Kennedy School. Chuck Thornton is an international security policy expert who provided program management support to the US Government’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program and is currently a research fellow at the University of Maryland.

Tags: Cold War, Featured, India, nuclear weapons, Pakistan, South Asia

Posted in Afghanistan, Blog, India, News | 1,677 Comments »

by Rebecca Winthrop

For the millions of people who read and were inspired by Greg Mortenson’s books, Three Cups of Tea and Stones into Schools, Sunday’s revelations by CBS News’ 60 Minutes that much of his story was at best vastly exaggerated and at worst fabricated, came as deep disappointment. For the thousands of Americans, including school children, who donated to his foundation, the Central Asia Institute, to build schools in the some of the most remote parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan, their disappointment is coupled with disillusionment that their money was probably not well spent.

As I travel around Pakistan this week and look at education issues across the country, including in the Federally Administered Northern Areas where Mortenson’s book Three Cups of Tea was set, I am struck by the bitter-sweet effect of these revelations. On the one hand, Mortenson’s book hid one of the country’s biggest educational success stories and promulgated a model of education assistance that has been proven time and again to be ineffective. On the other hand, his story captured the hearts of millions, bringing needed attention to the very real educational needs of Pakistan’s children and articulating the very important role good quality education can play in reducing conflict risk.

What is the real story of education in Pakistan’s Northern Areas, or Gilgit-Bultistan, as it is now called? How do we make sense of the damaging revelations about the Central Asia Institute that is dedicated to what many believe is still important work?

The Real Education Story in Gilgit-Bultistan

Contrary to the Three Cups of Tea portrayal of Gilgit-Bultistan as a place with little educational opportunity, it is one of the regions in Pakistan that has demonstrated true educational transformation over the last 50 years. In 1946, just prior to partition from India, there were an estimated six primary schools and one middle school for the entire region. Today there are over 1,800 primary, 500 middle, 420 high schools, and almost 40 higher education institutions. Girls are often noted to be outperforming boys and staying in school longer. It is true that community leadership and civil society organizations have played a major role in this transformation; it just was not Mortenson’s Central Asia Institute. When I asked the governor of Gilgit-Bultistan, Pir Syed Karam Ali Shah, how this education transformation came about, he was quick to point to the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), a network of private, international, nondenominational development organizations, an assertion with which other education experts concur. Led by His Highness the Aga Khan, the spiritual leader of the Shia Ismaili Muslims, the concerted focus on improving education, and especially girls’ education, started in 1946 and has continued, led by community members, for decades. Initially starting in the Ismaili communities in Gilgit-Bultistan, the work spread quickly to other non-Ismaili communities in the region, when the clear economic and health benefits of educating girls were seen by neighboring communities. Many civil society organizations, government interventions and public-private partnerships have developed over time, helping to increase levels of human capital and capacity through heavy investment in education, particularly of girls. According to Mehnaz Aziz, member of the national Pakistan Education Task Force, if the rest of Pakistan could only follow in the footsteps of the people of Gilgit-Bultistan, the status of education in Pakistan would be greatly improved.

Yes, There Is an Education Crisis in Pakistan

Despite the education success story of Gilgit-Bultistan, there is a serious education crisis for large numbers of Pakistani children across the country. The underlying message of Mortenson’s book and his related advocacy – that investment in education is greatly needed in Pakistan and it is an important part in promoting peace – still holds true, despite whatever factual inaccuracies in his book. One in 10 of the world’s primary school-age children who are not in school live in Pakistan, making Pakistan one of the top two countries in the world with the largest numbers of out of school children. Only 23 percent of Pakistan’s youth are enrolled in secondary school. At the current rate, the province of Balochistan will only be able to enroll all its children in school by the year 2100. With half the country under the age of 17, this poor state of education is a significant economic and security liability. Increasing access to quality education is likely to reduce Pakistan’s risk of conflict as cross-country estimates show that increasing educational attainment is strongly correlated with conflict risk reduction. Last month, a national campaign – Education Emergency Pakistan 2011 – was launched to spur country-wide dialogue on the need to prioritize educational investment and progress.

Good Intentions Are Not Enough

Despite the importance of Mortenson’s message on the education crisis in Pakistan, the effectiveness of his Central Asia Institute remains questionable. Good intentions do not necessarily translate into effective international development practices and NGO management. In the ongoing search for successful aid models, it is important to highlight that there are many professional non-profit organizations that do excellent education work in Pakistan. Many of them are Pakistani organizations, such as the Citizens Foundation and the Children’s Global Network. Community involvement and leadership are central to many of the work of these organizations, which is further supported by the education expertise of local staff and implementation of basic organizational management principles to track funds and monitor activities.

Stop Just Building Schools

One of the weaknesses of Mortenson’s work on the ground in Pakistan is the education approach he used. “Several of the schools I have seen that he has built in Gilgit-Bultistan are very good structures,” says one senior Pakistani NGO leader, “but his strategy of just building a school and then not providing any other follow up support is one that I think will be unlikely to succeed.” Indeed, Mortenson is neither the first nor the last person to try and solve education problems by building schools. The developing world is littered with school buildings waiting for teachers to be deployed and students to attend. Far greater education minds than Mortenson have fallen into this same trap. In one West African nation I visited, a major World Bank and Ministry of Education project to improve education infrastructure led to new school buildings standing vacant for months and months while teacher deployment and student enrollment systems tried to catch up. Given his almost singular focus on building schools, it is not surprising that some of them appear to have fallen into this same fate. A recent report by McKinsey & Company finds that in the effort to improve education, far too much focus has been placed on inputs such as school buildings and far too little on the improvement of the teaching and learning process.

It is unfortunate that the 60 Minutes expose has called into question the accuracy of Greg Mortenson’s books. Without defending Mortenson or whether the facts in his memoirs are accurate, I can say truthfully that there is indeed a very serious education crisis in Pakistan. The international community should not lose sight of this and the real needs of the Pakistani children and youth seeking to improve their lives.

Rebecca Winthrop is the Director of the Center for Universal Education

Tags: 60 minutes, Afghanistan, Aga Khan Development Network, central asia institute, Children’s Global Network, Citizens Foundation, Education Emergency Pakistan, FATA, Featured, Gilgit-Bultistan, greg mortenson, ismaili, Mehnaz Aziz, Pakistan, Pakistan Education Task Force, Pir Syed Karam Ali Shah, three cups of tea

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By Wajid Ali Syed

Salmaan Taseer is dead. He’s neither the first politician, first liberal, the first outspoken bullish pugnacious politician who was killed. Nor is he last. There were many, there will be more. He was the sitting governor of Pakistan’s biggest province and was assassinated by his own bodyguard. 

Does Pakistan suffer today because of his death? Yes. Does it change anything on the ground? No. 

He was slain because he called the notorious blasphemy law as black law. (more…)

Tags: Bush, christians, Courts, drones, Featured, Judiciary, law and order, Left, Liberals, Minorities, Muslims, Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, Right, Salmaan Taseer, terror, US, Ziaul Haq

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The Islamabad station chief of the Central Intelligence Agency hastily departed from Pakistan last week after his cover was blown due to a suspected deliberate leak by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence. This act is the latest evidence of the tense relationship between the two spy agencies.

It is believed that his cover was blown in retaliation for naming ISI chief Ahamad Shuja Pasha in a US lawsuit by families of 26/11 Mumbai attack victims. The suit asserts that Pasha and other ISI officers were ‘purposefully engaged in the direct provision of material support or resources’ to the planners of the Mumbai attacks.

A similar legal complaint was filed in Pakistan on behalf of Kareem Khan, a resident of North Waziristan who said that his son and brother were killed in a drone strike. Khan was seeking $500 million in compensation, and accusing CIA’s top officer in Pakistan of running a clandestine spying operation out of the United States Embassy.

This locking of horns should have been tackled sensibly. Instead, (more…)

Tags: Afghanistan, AfPak, Al Qaeda, CIA, Featured, ISI, Militancy, Military, Pakistan, Taliban, US

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