The Pakistan Update

Pakistani PM Yousuf Raza Gilani is travelling to Qatar where officials indicate he will discuss peace efforts in Afghanistan.

The government has described the official agenda of his three-day visit as an opportunity to boost trade ties.

But officials have also confirmed that US efforts to establish a dialogue with the Taliban, hosted by the Qataris, will be discussed.

Analysts say his trip raises questions about Pakistan’s role in future talks.

The BBC’s Jill McGivering says that it is not clear what position Mr Gilani will take. He says his country wants a stable Afghanistan and will support any Afghan-led peace process

“He will meet among others the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani and Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem bin Jabr al-Thani,” foreign ministry spokesman Abdul Basit is quoted as saying by the AFP news agency.

He added that the visit would seek to open up opportunities for co-operation between the countries.

But analysts say the issue of talks with the Taliban will also be considered important.

Our correspondent says that there is a sense that Pakistan, like the Afghan government, has felt excluded from the talks process – and takes that exclusion as a diplomatic snub.

The Taliban confirmed last month that they planned to set up a political office in Qatar ahead of possible talks with the US.

Pakistan has stressed recently in public that it is now being briefed by the Americans on those talks.

The Qatar talks are now being challenged by President Karzai’s initiative to instigate separate direct talks involving the Taliban and the Afghan government, hosted by the Saudis.

The Taliban’s support for the rival process is far from certain and it is not clear which set of talks, if any, will be backed by Pakistan.

Given its influence with the Taliban, Islamabad’s choice may be crucial. The difficulty for the US, our correspondent says, is that Pakistan’s proximity to the Taliban is what makes it both part of a possible solution and also part of the problem.

Pakistan has been accused in the past of playing a double game when it comes to the Taliban. If both the Americans and the Afghan government are now eager for its help, its loyalties could once again be tested.

Officials say that Mr Gilani will meet the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani and Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jabr Al-Thani.

Originally appeared on bbc news.

Tags: Afghanistan, hamad bin jassim bin jabr al-thani, Taliban, US, Yousaf Raza Gilani

Posted in Afghanistan, Around, News | 1 Comment »

Afghanistan and Pakistan plan to open a second front in negotiations with the Taliban in Saudi Arabia as US-brokered talks get under way in Qatar, officials said Sunday.

The Taliban, ousted from power by a US-led invasion in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, announced this month that they planned to set up a political office in Qatar ahead of talks with Washington.

And Taliban negotiators have begun holding preliminary talks with US officials on plans for negotiations aimed at ending the decade-long Afghan war, a former Taliban official said Sunday.

But Afghan and Taliban officials indicated in response to a BBC report about plans for talks in Saudi Arabia that both Kabul and Islamabad – usually at loggerheads on the issue – were looking for their own talks with the Taliban.

Asked for his response to the BBC report, Afghan foreign ministry spokesperson Janan Mosazai said: “Of course, we support any steps toward the Afghan peace process.” He refused to comment further.

But a senior Afghan government official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told AFP the BBC report was accurate, saying: “We will always pursue all roads toward peace in Afghanistan, including contacts with the Taliban that are not limited to the Qatar office.”

A member of the Taliban’s leadership council, the Pakistan-based Quetta Shura, also backed the report of talks in Saudi Arabia.

“The idea that the Taliban should have a point of contact in Saudi is pushed by the Pakistan and Afghan governments,” he said on condition of anonymity.

“This is because they think they have been sidelined. They want some control over peace talks.”

Supporting this theory, Kabul announced Sunday that Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar would visit Kabul on Wednesday, marking what Mosazai called a “new phase” in co-operation between the two countries.

Khar would meet President Hamid Karzai to “discuss the fight against terrorism and Pakistan’s essential support to the peace process in Afghanistan,” he said.

Khar’s visit comes after the always-touchy relations between the two countries broke down following the assassination of Kabul’s chief peace envoy, Burhanuddin Rabbani, in September.

Karzai accused Pakistan of responsibility for the murder and said Islamabad was sabotaging all attempts at negotiations with the Taliban.

The president was wary over being sidelined in the Qatar talks, leading Washington to dispatch special envoy Marc Grossman to Kabul last week to assure him of a central role for his government in any major negotiations.

And in another effort to soothe Karzai’s doubts, a delegation from the Qatar government is expected to visit Kabul to explain its role in the talks.

Preliminary negotiations between the US and the Taliban are already under way in the Gulf state, a former Taliban official who is now a member of the Afghan government appointed High Peace Council said Sunday.

“The actual peace talks have not yet begun – they are in the process of trust-building and obviously this will take some time,” Mawlavi Qalamuddin, who once led the Taliban’s feared religious police when the hardline Islamists were in power, told AFP.

One of the trust-building measures demanded by the Taliban is the release of five of its members from Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, while Washington wants the insurgents to renounce violence.

Originally appeared in the montreal gazette

Tags: 9/11 attacks, Afghanistan, burhanuddin rabbani, Guantánamo, Hamid Karzai, hina rabbani khar, islamists, Kabul, malvi qalamuddin, Saudi Arabia, Taliban, US

Posted in Afghanistan, Around, Blog | No Comments »

By Tom Wright

Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani fired his defense secretary Wednesday just hours after the nation’s military warned that Mr. Gilani’s recent attacks on the army chief could have “grievous consequences.”
Mr. Gilani, in recent weeks, has taken an unusually strident tone against the army, which has ruled Pakistan for half its 65-year history and maintains a powerful role.

Last month, Mr. Gilani told a meeting he was worried about a potential conspiracy to unseat his government and warned the military to remember that it is governed by civilian institutions.

The increasing tensions risk destabilizing Pakistan and causing policy paralysis at a time when the U.S. is hoping for the country’s support as it attempts to deepen peace talks with the Taliban and wind down the war in Afghanistan.

Mr. Gilani has been angered by allegations which surfaced in the fall that his government asked for Washington’s help to forestall a coup in May after the covert U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden. That raid, on a Pakistan garrison town and without forewarning the Pakistanis, viagra embarrassed the military.

Pakistan’s Supreme Court is conducting an investigation into the allegations. The ruling Pakistan People’s Party denies involvement and says the probe is politically motivated. It has blamed the court for siding with the military in an attempt to destabilize the government. The army has backed the probe.

Mr. Gilani upped his attack on the army this week, giving an interview to China’s official People’s Daily Online, in which he claimed that army chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and head of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate spy agency Ahmed Shuja Pasha had acted unconstitutionally in responding through written answers to the court’s questions.

The statement was engineered to embarrass Gen. Kayani, who was on a six-day visit to China, which ended Tuesday.

The army responded with a news release Wednesday which denied the army had submitted its responses directly to the Supreme Court, as charged by Mr. Gilani, but had instead gone through the Defense Ministry, as required by the constitution.

“This has very serious ramifications with potentially grievous consequences for the country,” the army said of Mr. Gilani’s assertions.

It did not elaborate what the consequences could be. The statement set off discussion in Pakistan’s media of a potential military takeover.

But the government showed few signs of stepping back from a fight. Immediately following the release, Mr. Gilani’s office announced the government was firing Naeem Khalid Lodhi, a retired army general who was the country’s top defense bureaucrat, for misconduct.

A Pakistani official said Mr. Gilani believed Mr. Lodhi had worked to help the military increase pressure on the civilian government. Mr. Gilani replaced Mr. Lodhi with Nargis Sethi, a career bureaucrat who is also currently cabinet secretary and viewed as close to the prime minister.

The heightened tensions come after Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari, who co-chairs the PPP, went to Dubai for emergency medical treatment in December after suffering a mini-stroke. That visit sparked rumors he was going into exile to flee the Supreme Court’s probe. That proved untrue, and Mr. Zardari returned to Pakistan in late December.

The PPP-led administration, which came to power in 2008, has balanced the military by giving it wide powers to run foreign policy and defense. This strategy, until now, has kept the government in power, but recent tensions show this arrangement is coming under stress.

Mr. Zardari also has faced a hostile Supreme Court, which has become a third center of aspirant executive power in the country after the civilian government and the military.

On Tuesday, the Supreme Court warned Mr. Gilani, the prime minister, that he could be removed from office if he refuses to take action against Mr. Zardari over corruption charges.

The court in 2009 ruled to throw out an amnesty on corruption investigations that had shielded Mr. Zardari from investigation. Mr. Zardari spent 11 years in a Pakistan jail for alleged corruption but was never formally convicted of a crime.

Mr. Zardari, the widower of Benazir Bhutto, the former Pakistan prime minister who was assassinated in 2007, says the charges dating to the 1990s were politically motivated.

The government has refused to open a corruption investigation, citing the president’s immunity from prosecution.

This originally appeared in the wall street journal.

Tags: Afghanistan, General Kiyani, Osama Bin Laden, Supreme Court of Pakistan, Taliban, washington, Yusuf Raza Gilani

Posted in News | 8 Comments »

By Mahir Ali

A few days before Barack Obama`s much-anticipated announcement about reversing the troop surge in Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai issued one of his sporadic declarations of relative independence from the forces that have sustained him in office for nine years.

“They are here for their own purposes, for their own goals, and they are using our soil for that,” he said in reference to the American and Nato military presence. Karzai also spoke of “chemical materials” in the western weaponry — presumably a reference to the use of uranium or other radioactive materials — which he said meant that “our people get killed, but also our environment is damaged.”

The first American response was a rebuke from retired general Karl Eikenberry, the outgoing US ambassador in Kabul (who, incidentally, advised Obama against a surge two years ago). “America has never sought to occupy any nation in the world,” he declared. “We are a good people.”

Quite a few nations that have borne the brunt of American imperialism would beg to differ. Yet his statement that “when we hear ourselves being called occupiers and worse … our pride is offended and we begin to lose our inspiration to carry on” is open to interpretation as a partial explanation for the withdrawals whereby American troop strength in Afghanistan will be reduced by 33,000 before the end of next year.

But that will still leave twice as many boots on the ground as there were at the start of Obama`s tenure. The US president`s explanation for his drawdown — in the face of opposition from the military hierarchy and administration hawks — did not pursue the Eikenberry line of thought. Nor did he make the mistake of declaring `mission accomplished`, despite the suggestion that the withdrawal was justified because its goals had been achieved.

There is plenty of evidence, however, that domestic political considerations are the primary driving force behind the slashing of resources expended on military adventures overseas. Nearly 10 years after the September 11 terrorist attacks, opinion polls suggest that a majority of Americans oppose the military presence in Afghanistan. And the urge to conclude American participation in this open-ended conflict is by no means restricted to Democrats: a substantial proportion of prospective Republican candidates for next year`s presidential contest appear to be keen on a more rapid withdrawal of forces.

None of them are willing to admit, of course, that the American response to 9/11 was essentially misdirected. At the time, a commando operation against Al Qaeda would have made considerably more sense than an all-out invasion of Afghanistan. The Taliban regime — officially recognised only by its sponsors in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE — was indeed appalling in any number of ways, but it did not pose a threat to the US.

The sanctuary it afforded to Osama bin Laden and his cohorts was incidental. The 9/11 attacks were not contingent on a base in Afghanistan. The conspirators held consultations in Hamburg and trained in the US. The location of their mentors was only marginally relevant. It did not suffice as justification for all-out war. Yet hardly anyone in the US opposed that war when it was launched. The thirst for retribution is not hard to fathom; the nation described in the second half of the 20th century by one of its outstanding personalities, Martin Luther King Jr, as “the greatest purveyor of violence in the world” wasn`t accustomed to being attacked on its own soil. But the effort to quench that thirst was misdirected from the outset. It exhibited a bloodlust that more than matched that of its foes — who had, let`s not forget, been its allies until a few years before.

It is now being argued that the incipient pullout from Afghanistan is somehow related to the successful targeting of bin Laden and the degradation of Al Qaeda. Bin Laden was tracked down to a not-very-safe house in Pakistan, far away from the drone zone where American forces have long operated with impunity from unassailable heights. Al Qaeda`s remaining adherents in the region — believed to number in the dozens — as well as the Taliban leadership are believed to mostly be in Pakistan.

That makes it hard to explain why combat operations are being conducted in Afghanistan — amid, mind you, contacts that could lead to negotiations with the Taliban.

American security relations with Pakistan, meanwhile, have hit a new low in the wake of the bin Laden raid. It does not require particularly deep insight to fathom why the CIA decided against sharing its plans for that raid with Pakistani authorities. Although no substantial evidence has emerged of high-level Pakistani involvement in providing a sanctuary to bin Laden, the manner in which Harkat-ul-Mujahideen — a banned militant group with suspected links to military intelligence — and Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) reacted almost simultaneously with vehement denials of American insinuations of contacts between Harkat and Al Qaeda is certainly intriguing.

ISPR has also been keen to reject American press reports about a brewing revolt within the Pakistani armed forces against the military hierarchy on account of its relations with the US. Doth it protest too much?

Perhaps. It has long been obvious, though, that the struggle against violent religious extremists in Pakistan is something of a lost cause unless it can be portrayed as a Pakistani war. The drone attacks regularly launched from the Shamsi air base in Balochistan have not been particularly helpful in this regard, especially when they entail civilian casualties. The idea that the Americans will maintain forces numbering 25,000 or so even after a `complete` withdrawal from Afghanistan a few years hence, in order to retain the capacity for military interventions in Pakistan, is not particularly reassuring.

The notion that Pakistan is host to terrorists with an international reach is hardly a fantasy. But the notion that US military adventures and expeditions abroad — be they in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen or Pakistan — are somehow going to diminish the likelihood of attacks on American soil remains a dangerous illusion.

This article originally appeared in Dawn.

Tags: 9/11 attacks, Afghanistan, Barack Obama, Hamid Karzai, Iraq, karl eikenberry, martin luther king, NATO, Pakistan, somalia, Taliban, us military, yemen

Posted in Afghanistan, Blog | 1,765 Comments »

by Wajid Ali Syed

The relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan has almost always been termed as crucial. It has also been characterized as complicated because of the mistrust on both sides. The question is, why is there so much suspicion? Is it just because of the difference of interests, that the U.S. wants to do one thing while Pakistan another or is it more than that? So far, the reports that have surfaced suggest the latter. The difference of opinion of the people running the war on terror — on both sides — has resulted in a tumultuous relationship.

Even if the U.S. and Pakistan were on the same page on how best to combat terrorism, conflicting and false interpretations of history don’t help. Pakistanis do try to twist the facts in their own favor to boost hatred against the United States. Their reason is primarily based on America’s decision to abandon Pakistan after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. They are now not ready to budge. This can easily be overcome if the U.S. comes clean about all their operations against the militants. They need to share their plans with their allies, especially Pakistani politicans and the people, instead of dealing solely with the military and carrying out covert operations. Did Pakistan agree with the U.S. to use drone strikes or not? If there was an agreement — verbal or written — the U.S. should share that information. This one point can help the U.S. gain trust and would go a long way towards eliminating biases and mistrust over the use of drones.

Americans need to know truth about this war too. They need to understand why Pakistan is an ally and how it can help the U.S. negotiate with the Afghan Taliban. This could only happen once the big shots in Washington jettison their version of the war story and keep their facts straight.

Here’s an example. Richard Clarke — a long time security expert who served four presidents and was the chief counter-terrorism advisor for the National Security Council was on Bill Maher’s show blatantly accusing Pakistan of creating the Afghan Taliban to fight India.

If someone like Clarke, who has been the decision maker on security issues, is way off the mark, then the outcome of this war could be disastrous.

The Taliban in Afghanistan was an indigenous movement formed to counter the Northern Alliance. The Taliban movement was primarily made up of Pashtun tribesmen, the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. Their purpose was to counter the Northern Alliance’s corrupt government. In 1994 and 1995, the Pakistan government was tasked by the U.S. to support the Taliban to restore law and order in Afghanistan and facilitate the construction of UNOCAL’s oil and gas pipeline projects.

The U.S. once again used the Taliban and Pakistan government in its favor just like it used the mujahideen. And like before, things got out of hand. Al- Qaeda became enemies of the U.S. The Taliban eventually backed al-Qaeda, which went on to terrorize the world.

The Taliban government proceeded to impose their brutal interpretation of sharia law on the country. Initially, the U.S. supported the Taliban, hoping they would restore order to a country ravaged by the war against the Soviets.

After 9/11, the U.S. wasted 10 years, billions of dollars and thousands of lives. It blamed the Pakistan army for supporting the Afghan Taliban while at the same time attempting to secretly strike a deal with the Taliban. Either you blame and squabble or join hands and find a solution. Like the expression goes, you can’t have your cake and eat it too.

In the meantime, the U.S. also supported former members of the Northern Alliance and warlords without considering that there cannot be peace in Afghanistan until the Pashtun Afghans get their fair share to rule the country. Even now, a large number of Afghan police and army trained by the U.S. and NATO forces are made up of non-Pashtuns. If the Pashtuns get their way and are included in such projects, discrimination does not let them survive for long. The Pashtuns complain that the Northern Alliance has monopolized important ministry positions, governorships, and embassy postings abroad.

Years later, the U.S. is back to square one, without having learned the lesson that there is no military solution to Afghanistan and Pakistan problem.

The U.S. needs to gain the trust of the people of Pakistan. It needs to realize that Pakistan’s army is not the same as Pakistan. The U.S. needs to ally with the politicians and support democratic institutions instead of men in uniform. The best way to wash off the mistrust is to engage the population and invest in education rather than in arm deals. The Saudis build schools that children can attend for free. The result? In many cases, extremist madrassahs become the only educational option. Why not invest in teaching children how to read?

It needs to negotiate and cut deals with the same Taliban back in Afghanistan. The efforts to achieve peace will be in vain until the U.S. considers Pakistan’s position, keeps its facts straight, brings the truth out in the open and accepts its share of blame. The solution to the Afghan problem cannot be reached until all the facts are understood and all the parties involved are on board.

This article originally appeared in the Huffington Post

Tags: Afghanistan, Al Qaeda, drones, Extremism, northern alliance, pakistani politician, Pashtun, Richard Clarke, Soviet Union, Taliban, US Pakistan relations

Posted in Afghanistan, Blog | 2,549 Comments »

By Michael Krepon

Abbottabad is a quiet, lovely city. The Stimson Center convened a Track II workshop there for rising Pakistani strategic analysts. The city’s most prominent feature remains Kakul, the Pakistani military academy where outstanding recruits begin their studies and service careers. On April 23rd, the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Kayani, visited Kakul to congratulate recent graduates. According to press accounts of the Army Chief’s remarks, Kayani claimed that Pakistani security forces “have broken the back of terrorists and the nation will soon prevail over the menace.” Kayani also asserted that the Pakistan Army “was completely aware of internal and external threats to the country.” Osama bin Laden’s compound was a mile away from the parade ground where Kayani spoke.

Pakistani authorities must be feeling acute embarrassment and resentment at this juncture: embarrassment at Osama’s presence within Pakistan, despite numerous official denials of this possibility, and resentment at a severe breach of Pakistani sovereignty in a settled area. Had U.S. special forces and intelligence failed in this effort, the repercussions on U.S.-Pakistan relations would have been horrific. Having succeeded in bringing Osama bin Laden to justice, the repercussions are extremely trying but not grounds for a divorce. Pakistan’s civil authorities have put a positive gloss on Osama’s death, pointing to longstanding and oft-repeated U.S. statements that, if the location of al-Qaeda’s leadership were correctly ascertained, military action would result. That Pakistan’s security apparatus appears to have been kept in the dark speaks volumes about the growing difficulties of this partnership.

As a reflection of his competence and Pakistan’s extremely troubled internal and external security environment, General Kayani received a three-year extension by the current Pakistani civilian government. The Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence, Lt. General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, has received two one-year extensions. The presence of Osama bin Laden near Kakul reflects very poorly on both of them. The number two ranking al Qaeda figure, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the worst offenders of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, are widely believed to be on Pakistani territory.

Hard times lie ahead for U.S.-Pakistan relations. Our interests in Afghanistan diverge as well as converge. Groups that engage in violent acts against U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan and against targets in India are based, trained and equipped on Pakistani soil, without serious interference by Pakistan’s security apparatus. It is far more convenient and popular for Pakistani politicians to rail against U.S. drone strikes than against extensive Muslim-on-Muslim violence within their country.

Osama bin Laden’s violent demise comes at a time when U.S. expenditures in Afghanistan are reaching the half-trillion dollar mark. It is far from clear that the tactical achievements of U.S. forces there can result in long-lasting gains. It is even more apparent that Pakistan loses by being a safe haven for violent extremists. Osama’s death provides an opportunity for Pakistani and U.S. authorities to reconsider the sources of their deeply troubled relationship.

Michael Krepon is the co-founder of the Stimson Center and the co-editor of “Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia”.

Tags: Abbottabad, Afghanistan, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Featured, General Ashfaq Kayani, ISI, Lt. General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, Osama Bin Laden, Pakistan, Pakistan Army, Taliban, US Pak relations

Posted in Around, Blog, News | 1,515 Comments »

By Wajid Ali Syed

Bin Ladin is dead. Again. In the last ten years he has been reported “killed” at least four times. The only difference this time was that the President of the United States announced the death of the number one terrorist in the world. Above all, this time he was killed not in Tora Bora, not Karra Kurrum, but Abbottabad – close to an army garrison in Pakistan. As expected, his killing has raised questions, and more questions, and still more questions every time a new statement is added to the swirl of fact and myth that is turning the bin Laden raid into the stuff of legend.

Basically, a foreign national has been killed by another foreign army. (more…)

Tags: Abottabad, Al Qaeda, Army, CIA, Featured, ISI, Islamabad, Islamic groups, Obama, Osama Bin Laden, Pakistan, Taliban, US

Posted in Afghanistan, Around, Blog, India | 1,466 Comments »

by Christopher Dickey

Osama bin Laden’s cave turned out to be a mansion. The desolate mountains where he was hiding proved, in the end, to be the pleasant little hill town of Abbottabad, only 30 miles from the Pakistani capital, Islamabad. He’s been holed up, and on Sunday was at last gunned down, in the biggest house around. He lived with relatives and an entourage behind high walls topped with barbed wire, in a community that’s also home to several Pakistani army units. A military academy is just a few hundred yards down the road.

“There aren’t that many six-foot-plus Arabs walking around that town,” says M.J. Gohel of the Asia-Pacific Foundation in London. “Even if you buy a donkey there it creates a stir. So how could the Pakistani military not know about it?”

We shouldn’t be surprised. Several of the top Al Qaeda bad guys now at Guantánamo were captured deep inside Pakistani territory. And more often than not, they’d been living quite comfortably. “They’re not being caught in some haystack on the border,” Gohel told me back in 2004. Abu Zubaydah, Al Qaeda’s gatekeeper for new recruits and a planner of terrorist operations, got nailed in Faisalabad in 2002; Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the operational mastermind of 9/11, was dragged out of bed in the garrison city of Rawalpindi in 2003; Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, since convicted by a U.S. court for his role in the 1998 bombing of American embassies in Africa and now serving a life sentence in the United States, was grabbed in Gujrat in 2004. In fact, this is not news to U.S. intelligence officials. The overt and covert war along Pakistan’s northwest frontier is important for Afghanistan and American soldiers there. Some mid-level Al Qaeda commanders reportedly have been killed by drone attacks there. But for years, American analysts have suspected that Bin Laden enjoyed the same kind of comforts as his colleagues had had deep in Pakistan’s cities thanks to protection from parts of the Pakistani government and its Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, the infamous ISI. American operatives privately voiced suspicions that Bin Laden’s protectors either sympathized with him or saw him as the ultimate bargaining chip, or both.

So the covert operation closing in on Bin Laden at Abbottabad gained momentum over the last few months, even as the public friction between Washington and Islamabad grew more intense. In January, when two men allegedly tried to rob CIA operative Raymond Davis, he shot them dead—and got arrested by the Pakistanis for murder. Davis was freed in March after a lot of diplomatic maneuvering and payments to the families of the deceased, who pardoned Davis “in accordance with Pakistani law,” according to the White House. But as that case unraveled, it exposed the presence of hundreds of CIA personnel and contractors operating on Pakistani turf. And they weren’t just helping target Hellfire missiles near the Afghan frontier. Davis ran into trouble when he was gathering intelligence in Lahore on the other side of the country.

Last month, when Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen visited Pakistan, he spoke out publicly and with surprising force about America’s problems with the ISI. The specific issue he mentioned was the Pakistani intelligence organization’s “longstanding relationship” with the so-called Haqqani network, which works alongside the Taliban “supporting, funding, training fighters that are killing Americans and killing coalition partners” in Afghanistan. “I have a sacred obligation to do all I can to make sure that doesn’t happen,” said Mullen. “So that’s at the core—it’s not the only thing—but that’s at the core that I think is the most difficult part of the relationship.” Not the only thing indeed.

In President Barack Obama’s carefully phrased description of the “targeted operation” that killed Bin Laden he says cooperation with Pakistan “helped lead us to Bin Laden and the compound where he was hiding,” but it’s apparent “the small team of Americans” who killed him and took away his body were on their own.

Over the long run, the wars that Bin Laden did so much to begin on September 11, 2001, will not end unless some sort of understanding is reached with Pakistan’s government, its military and its intelligence service. “Going forward, it is essential that Pakistan continue to join us in the fight against Al Qaeda and its affiliates,” said Obama. But for its own geopolitical—and purely political—reasons Pakistan is likely to continue being as much part of the problem as part of the solution. At least after the Abbottabad shootout, it’s clear the administration isn’t kidding itself. When it got a shot at Bin Laden, it took it. No dithering. No dilatory diplomacy. Secrecy was maintained. The Pakistanis were cut out. And justice was done.

Christopher Dickey is the Paris bureau chief and Middle East editor for Newsweek Magazine and The Daily Beast.

Tags: Abbottabad, Abu Zubaydah, Admiral Mike Mullen, Afghanistan, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, Al Qaeda, Asia-Pacific Foundation, Barack Obama, Faisalabad, Featured, Guantánamo, Gujrat, haqqani network, Hellfire missiles, ISI, Islamabad, khalid sheikh mohammed, Lahore, M.J. Gohel, Osama Bin Laden, Pakistan, Pakistan Army, Rawalpindi, Raymond Davis, Taliban

Posted in Afghanistan, Blog, News | 1,985 Comments »

by Bruce Reidel

Osama bin Laden’s death is a severe blow to al Qaeda–but not its end. His death answers some key questions about the terror cell and Pakistan, but leaves some even more perplexing ones still open.

First, congratulations to President Obama and the CIA. From the very start of his administration he ordered an intense focus on al Qaeda and its leader. The trail had long gone cold due largely to the diversion of critical resources to Iraq back in 2002 and 2003. Obama rightly promised to focus on Pakistan, the center of the global jihad and the most dangerous country in the world, and his efforts have now paid off.

Many had questioned whether bin Laden was still alive almost ten years after 9/11. But there was never really any doubt. By eluding justice after his first attacks on America in 1998, bin Laden created a mystique of invulnerability. He remained not just a symbol of al Qaeda’s continuing threat but a real leader, issuing strategic direction and propaganda.

His death weakens al Qaeda’s cohesion and its image of being beyond the reach of America. It comes after two years of intense pressure on the group and its allies in Pakistan and Afghanistan from American drones in the skies as well as NATO boots on the ground in Afghanistan. Key lieutenants like his operational commander in Afghanistan, a fellow Saudi named Abdul Ghani, have been tracked down and killed just this spring. The pressure was designed to weaken al Qaeda’s operational tempo, disrupting its routines. The strategy has worked. Presumably his hideout deep in Pakistan also contained clues and data that will help further dismantle al Qaeda’s core.

But the terror cell has always known bin Laden was at risk and it has devolved much authority to his deputy, the Egyptian Ayman Zawahiri, and to others. Zawahiri has been the public face of al Qaeda for years. Just this year he has released five audio messages focused on the Arab spring (he put out only four in all of last year). Bin Laden in contrast was silent about the wave of revolutions in Arabia. The New Mexico born Yemeni Anwar Awlaki has emerged as another operational and propaganda hub with his on line English language magazine Inspire and his al Qaeda Yemen cell has tried to attack Detroit and Chicago already. We can expect effusive memorials from them to their fallen “martyr.”

And we should expect the threat of more al Qaeda attacks to remain real. This weekend, several terrorists linked to al Qaeda were arrested for plotting an attack in Germany. Last week, the group’s Maghreb affiliate struck in Morocco, killing Western tourists.

Obama was right to call his Pakistani counterpart, Asif Ali Zardari, to thank him for help in the chase. Zardari’s wife Benazir Bhutto was murdered by al Qaeda in 2007; the death of the country’s most popular and capable leader was perhaps the group’s biggest triumph since 9/11. Pakistan has yet to recover from her demise. Al Qaeda has been focused like a laser beam on Pakistan for the last decade. It rightly judges Pakistan to be both uniquely vulnerable in the Islamic world to jihadism and equipped with the ultimate strategic prize, the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world. With allies like the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba, al Qaeda will remain a threat to Pakistan’s nascent democracy and to peace in the Indian subcontinent.

Obama should schedule an early Zardari visit to Washington and his own visit later this year to Pakistan to signal our support for democratic forces there. We also now know what many long suspected: that Bin Laden was not hiding in Pakistan’s tribal wastelands, but rather in its heartland. He was killed in Abbotabad, the home town of Pakistan’s first military dictator, Ayub Khan, just thirty miles from the capital Islamabad. This raises the question: who helped him all these years hide in-country? He was not alone in al Qaeda in hiding out in Pakistan’s towns and cities. Khalid Shaykh Muhammad and Abu Zubayda, two key al Qaeda operatives, were caught in Pakistan’s urban centers. Mullah Omar, bin Laden’s Afghan Taliban partner (and the man he swore loyalty to even in the last few years) has long been thought to be hiding in Pakistan’s mega- port of Karachi. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has often publicly said she suspected some in the Pakistani establishment knew where to find bin Laden. She raised the right question. It remains a good one.

Al Qaeda long ago became more than a terror group. It is an idea, the concept of global jihad against America. It has an elaborate narrative to justify murder. But Bin Laden was caught off guard by the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions this winter and the wave of turmoil that has followed them. These popular uprisings challenged his whole worldview that terror and jihad were the only way to free Islam of its dictators and of what he called “Crusader-Zionist oppression.” The triumph of freedom in Tahrir Square was a blow to al Qaeda—a sign that aside from in Pakistan and Yemen, the group seemed increasingly marginalized. NATO is now fighting to free Libya, not to occupy it. Whether al Qaeda can adapt to the new Arab renaissance is an open question. Bin Laden won’t be able to answer it. Can his heirs?

Bruce Riedel, a former longtime CIA officer, is a senior fellow in the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution. At Obama’s request, he chaired the strategic review of policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2009.

Tags: 9/11, Abbotabad, Abdul Ghani, Abu Zubayda, Al Qaeda, Anwar Awlaki, Ayman Zawahiri, Ayub Khan, Benazir assassination, Benazir Bhutto, CIA, drones, Featured, Hillary Clinton, Islamabad, Jihad, karachi, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, Lashkar e Taiba, Mullah Omar, NATO, Obama, Pakistan, President Asif Ali Zardari, Taliban

Posted in Afghanistan, Blog, News | 1,021 Comments »

by Dr. Manzur Ejaz

Each time an-anti American spell is created, the religious right becomes stronger and bolder. It may not have fatally bitten the deep state directly but it has created havoc with Pakistan’s economy

It is likely that Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies have been involved in whipping up the Raymond Davis case and then getting him released on quasi-legal grounds. Now, the military has put its foot down to stop drone attacks after several years of silent acquiescence. The push-back against the Americans could be a smokescreen to attract the anti-American fervour of the nation’s public and eventually enter North Waziristan (NW), but the rhetoric may further empower the religious right and extremist groups.

Pakistan’s ‘deep state’ — that is what some people have started calling the sum total of the military and its agencies — has been playing the anti-American game through the religious right and wandering patriots like Imran Khan to pursue its policy objectives. Seemingly, the strategy has worked in the short-run but the monster of religious extremism and irrational nationalism has been growing and taking on a life of its own.

It is reasonable to assume the highest levels of US leadership would have contacted the Pakistan military’s top brass and ISI chief to have Raymond Davis released immediately after his arrest. Obviously, not only did the military refuse to intervene but it also prompted its media auxiliaries to hype up the matter. Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and other religious parties, keen to provide some kind of political cover to the Taliban and other jihadi groups, picked up the issue and created anti-American street hysteria in Pakistan. Arguably, the deep state may have done this to assert itself against its American partners, some cynics saying this was a ploy to get more money.

The sudden release of Raymond Davis has probably come after the outstanding issues were resolved. We know what amount of diyat (blood money) was paid to Fahim and Faizan’s families but we have no information on what the deep state got in return. We do not want to belabour this point too much because the Pakistan military may have very genuine issues that the US was not listening to, and using the Raymond Davis card meant protecting the state’s interests. But, immediately after the Davis deal, the US foolishly caused the death of citizens who were holding a jirga in Datta Khel. Pakistan’s military chief reacted sharply and, according to recent reports, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has begun patrolling the Pak-Afghan border to repulse future drone attacks.

Pakistan’s military may have been genuinely angered by US ungratefulness; the dust from the Raymond Davis case has not yet cleared and the US has bombed citizens in an area where anti-Americanism is already a serious threat to the establishment. However, it is hard to believe that Pakistan will begin shooting down US drones to stop the attacks that it has silently condoned and cooperated with for years. Due to economic and other needs, Pakistan is not in a position to alienate the US to the extent that it is perceived as a hostile force.

In all probability, the Pakistani military is getting ready to go into NW and take charge instead of leaving it to the drone attacks. Before heavy deployment in NW, Pakistan’s military wants to win over the common people of that area through assuming the mantle of anti-American rhetoric for which it was using the religious right brigade in the past. Furthermore, the US logistically cannot use drone attacks in NW once the Pakistan military has a heavy presence in that area. Such factors lead us to believe that the patrolling of the Pak-Afghan border by the PAF is a precursor for a South Waziristan-like military operation in NW.

The Pakistan military has to cleanse NW whether it likes it or not. However, the question is how long it can afford to assume to leadership of anti-America rhetoric. Probably not for long and, eventually, it will be inclined to revert back to the religious jihadi brigade to keep the US on its toes. This is what the deep state is accustomed to, but it has a price: each time an-anti American spell is created, the religious right becomes stronger and bolder. It may not have fatally bitten the deep state directly but it has created havoc with Pakistan’s economy.

In the years prior to these recent developments, the Pakistan Army has maintained that it could not send troops on the ground in NW because it would be an overextension of their forces. This fact, along with the figures of the thousands of young Pakistani soldiers who have died fighting against extremism, should not just be rhetoric for the Pakistan Army, but a sign that their plan has backfired. This plan has always been to utilise the religious right wing to drum up sentiments that favour the shortsighted goals of the military, not the nation as a whole. Indeed, the nation has suffered greatly due to this myopic view of governance. The military must realise that using chips like Raymond Davis to create public support will only hurt their long-term survival and empower their enemies.

Furthermore, if Pakistan’s economy keeps on tanking due to religious extremism while India, China and the rest of the region keep on growing, how can Pakistan pretend to be a genuine and recognisable regional power of the kind that the deep state is obsessed with? Put simply, who, from inside or outside the country, will invest in a religiously intolerant nation? One can afford Salafi Islam and other forms of theocracy if one has oil reserves like Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, if livelihood is going to come from human efforts then the deep state had better start thinking about how the religious brigade affects this process and whether it is appropriate to use it for policy goals in the future.

Tags: anti-Americanism, china, diyat, Drone Attacks, imran khan, India, Iran, ISI, Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam, North Waziristan, Pakistan Army, pakistan intelligence, Raymond Davis, Saudi Arabia, Taliban

Posted in Around, Blog, India, News | 1,439 Comments »